# 1NC

### 1NC – Historical Method Alt

#### The discourse of the 1AC normalizes the NATO security apparatus through which Empire is made to look moral and just. The 1AC is the foot soldier extending hegemonic power through educational networks like this debate round.

Kuus 2007 (Merje, political geographer studying epistemology of institutions, "'Love, Peace and Nato': Imperial Subject-Making in Central Europe," Antipode, Vol. 39, Issue 2, pg. 269-290, March 2007, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

NATO enlargement involves a two-fold legitimation. It rests firstly on making NATO everyday and unremarkable, and secondly on making it morally good. The effect is one of simultaneous banalization and glorification of NATO. The alliance is on the one hand made so common sense as to be boring—below political debate. It is on the other hand made existential and essential—above debate. The first side of this coin of legitimation—that of banalization—is a key feature of geopolitical discourses. These discourses rely not as much on formal arguments about science and strategy as on the notion of common sense (O’Tuathail and Agnew 1992:193). Their political success stems not from their deep meaning, but from their dailiness and banality. The militarization of political debate and everyday life is made possible in significant measure by domesticating military power as everyday (Cohn 1987; Lutz 2001). The military–industrial complex, or the military–industrial–media–entertainment network in Der Derian’s (2001) more precise terminology, is made to appear both virtual and virtuous, both clean and good. Its material infrastructure and material effects are thereby erased from political debate. This is clearly the case with NATO. Military terminology is all but absent from discussions of the world’s most powerful military alliance (Sidaway 2001:602). It has thus become acceptable and indeed common to speak of war— such as the one in Kosovo in 1999—as an “operation” concerned with “building civil society” (see also Feldman 2003; Sidaway 2003). Yet as Arendt (1964:288) famously pointed out over 40 years ago, banal is not synonymous with benign. Evil can arise not from sinister intent but from unthinking adherence to the taken-for-granted (see also Billig 1995; Gregory 2004). To speak of the banality of the military–industrial complex, then, is not to imply triviality, but to specify its mechanisms of operation and legitimation. It is to underscore the “set of silent ethical assertions that pre-organize explicit ethicopolitical discourses” (Shapiro 1997:16)—in this case the assertions that enable discussions of NATO to revolve around the notions of right, peace, culture, and values. As Enloe (2004:220) points out, most of the militarization of social life, a process in which social practices gain value and legitimacy by being associated with military force, occurs in peacetime. To understand the dynamics of this process, then, we need to look at the mundane rather than the spectacular, the civilian rather than the military. The second aspect of the legitimation of NATO—the constitution of military power as good—is a key part of what Hardt and Negri (2000:9) call the new inscription of authority. Today’s global power relations, they argue, are based not on force itself, but on the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace. These relations rely on an “ethico-political dynamic”, which envelops the entire space of what it considers civilization—a boundless, universal space (ibid.:11). This ethico-political dynamic lays the foundation for a renewed notion of just war: no longer an activity of defense or resistance, but one that is justified in itself, by the appeal to essential values and justice. This just war combines two elements: first, the legitimacy of the military apparatus insofar as it is ethically grounded, and second, the effectiveness of military action to achieve the desired order and peace. The Empire’s powers of intervention do not begin directly with its weapons of lethal force but rather with its moral instruments (Hardt and Negri 2000:35). They are based on the production of the normative space of imperial right. Intervention becomes juridically legitimate only when it is inserted into existing international consensuses. The first task of the Empire is “to enlarge the realm of the consensuses that support its own power” (ibid.:15).2 The military complex becomes a key part of the production of moral good (see also Flint and Falah 2004 for an in-depth discussion of the concept of just war). Hardt and Negri conceptualize this new notion of right as a substantively new phenomenon. In the earlier disciplinary society, they argue, social power was effected through administrative apparatuses that produce and regulate customs and habits. In today’s society of control, in contrast, mechanisms of command become ever more “democratic”, ever more immanent in the social field. The normalizing apparatuses of disciplinary power do not simply intensify. In addition, and in contrast to disciplinary society, social control today extends well outside the structured sites of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks (Hardt and Negri 2000:23). Power has become biopolitical in that it extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the population. The new notion of right, then, is not simply imposed on localities and subjects from the outside. It is rather part and parcel of the very production of locality and subjectivity (Hardt and Negri 2000:30). According to Hardt and Negri (2004:13), security is a form of biopower in the sense that it is aimed not only at controlling a population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life.3 It is effective if it is an integral vital function of individuals. The movement from defense to security represents a shift from a reactive and conservative attitude to an active and constructive one (Agamben 2002). The normative space of imperial right is produced by a variety of bodies in the civil society, including the news media and especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Because these institutions are not run by governments, they are easily presented as acting on the basis of moral or ethical imperatives (ibid.:36). This dynamic is especially visible in the current “war on terror”, which popular legitimation centers on the concepts of identity and universal moral values (Dalby 2005). It is made possible by constructing military solutions as morally just (Flint and Falah 2004). Al Quaeda’s motives are identified as cultural and moral and so are the “western” or US responses.4 As such bundling up of security, culture, and moral values has moved to the centre stage of political legitimation since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, we need to closely investigate how the process works (Agamben 2002). Hardt and Negri overemphasize the novelty of imperial subjectmaking. They downplay the much longer processes of the construction of geographical and geopolitical knowledge, in which the notion of universal values has occupied a central position at least since the Age of Exploration (see Agnew 1998; Mignolo 1995). They also under-estimate the spatiality of power by conceptualizing imperial right as essentially a non-territorial universalizing process that encompasses the whole globe regardless of the current spatial configurations.5 Their argument’s utility for the present analysis stems from its focus on a key mechanism by which hegemonic power works today: not against but through the creative efforts of individuals. NATO enlargement exemplifies this mechanism. Whereas national security discourses still invoke the negative notion of threat, however “soft” and however indirect, NATO enlargement discourse invokes only positive categories—values, democracy, openness. NATO, like Empire, is a “machine for universal integration. It does not fortify its boundaries to push others away, but rather pulls them within its pacific order” (Hardt and Negri 2000:198). NATO is central to the institutional structure through which military intervention is organized and legitimized today, and it is continually bolstering its technical capabilities to operate globally. Its enlargement discourse is moralistic, affective, and adamantly non-territorial, as it emphasizes not territories but universal values. NATO enlargement can therefore illuminate in rich empirical detail how the production of imperial right and the militarization of social life work on a daily basis.

#### \*\*\*[Optionally Insert Additional Specific Links]

#### The alternative critiques NATO operations within their constitutive historical context. IR’s isolation of analysis from the past naturalizes the present and obscures the unconscious operations of power. The alt is the only way to come to grips with NATO’s referents of security.

**da Mota**, PhD in IR at University of Coimbra, **2016** (Sarah Carreira, "NATO: upholding Civilisation, protecting Individuals. The unconscious dimension of international security," University of Coimbra, September 2016, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

According to John Hobson, contemporary IR is “historophobic”, in that it “[v]iews historical analysis as superfluous or exogenous to the subject matter of the discipline” (2002: 5). To Hobson, IR scholars have mostly adopted an instrumentalist and exogenous view of history, in order to support and confirm theories of the present. Instead of that, Hobson suggests, we should employ a temporally relativist or constitutive reading of history, as a means to rethink theories and problematise the analysis of the present, thus reconfiguring the IR research agenda (ibid). However, it has not always been like that. At the time of its emergence as an academic discipline, in 1919, IR comprised a body of knowledge, which included history among other various disciplines, such as economics, sociology, law and moral philosophy (Hobden, 2002). But with the behaviourist revolution in the 1950’s and 1960’s, IR started privileging structure and space over time and context in analyses of world politics (Walker, 1989 cit. in Vaughan-Williams, 2005). This resulted in mainstream IR being reconstructed along asociological and ahistorical lines (Hobden, 2002). To Richard Ashley (1989: 263), the consequence of not dealing with what he considers to be the “problem of history” – i.e., the impossibility of getting historical interpretation completely right – is that IR prefers to impose a representation that closes ambiguity and controls the proliferation of meaning, instead of projecting the uncertainty of historical meaning onto its object of study. Hence, the idea that time is regular, as meanings remain stationary independently of the time they represent. More importantly, as a result of this aversion, insouciance or superficiality towards history, two “illusions” arise. On the one hand, the “reification illusion” consists in isolating the present from the past, making it appear as static, self-constituting, and autonomous; in other words, the present is represented as a reified entity, thereby obscuring its socio-temporal context (Hobson, 2002: 6). On the other hand, there is also a “naturalism illusion”, meaning that the present is naturalised on the basis that it emerged spontaneously in accordance with natural human imperatives, thereby obscuring the historical processes of social power, identity/social exclusion and norms that constitute the present (Hobson, 2002: 6). Clearly, both these illusions may be verified in the treatment of the object of this study. As suggested earlier, civilisation appears as a reified product in NATO literature, and normative evolutions such as the Individualisation of Security are naturalised without further questioning how and why they surged. Furthermore, according to historian Fernand Braudel (1958), social duration is an aspect of history that is often ignored and misconceived by the social sciences in general. Therefore, Braudel (1958: 726) defends the importance and usefulness of history in terms of its underlying dialectic of time. To him, the ability to perceive the antagonism between the instantaneous moment and the slowness of long time passing by – the “plurality of time” – is essential to understanding social reality.7 The problem of time is crucial for this research. It assumes that IR’s approach of temporality and of the meanings associated to it has been rather rigid, which has too often limited our reflection of international phenomena to short duration terms. In turn, this shortness of sight has hidden the importance of unconscious meanings and their perpetuation in history, which is why phenomena ultimately have appeared in naturalised and unquestioned ways. Likewise, analyses on NATO have primarily focused on short and medium term changes, without referring to any longer-term pattern, such as the implicaitons of civilisational defence. Therefore, it is a matter of reflecting on how a recent duration trend such as the Individualisation of Security fits into a longer-term objective – the civilisational heritage of the people in the NATO area. This work precisely attempts to address this gap in the literature on NATO in two interrelated ways. One consists in embracing time through a “long duration” framework – longue durée (Braudel, 1958). Once again, to Braudel (1979 apud Cox, 2002b), different segments of social and human life have different tempos or timings. Economic change operates at a different pace from art, architecture, or law, for example. Even though these changes may be related to each other, they are not synchronous. Consequently, the history of how mentalities evolve moves at a different pace from the history of material life, even if they both interact (ibid.). Under Braudel, these different histories and tempos contain three levels of time: (1) the level of immediacy, that is, the simple duration of events – l’histoire événementielle; it has no explanation, for it needs to be framed within the spatial and temporal context in which it occurs. (2) Conjunctures – conjonctures – represent an intermediary temporality, such as a protracted economic cycle, a persisting configuration of social forces, such as Fordism, social democracy, a scientific paradigm. (3) Long duration – longue durée – is a historical structure created by collective human activity throughout a large period of time; examples are language, moral code, and state system (ibid.). Consequently, it may be presumed that, within NATO, short-term changes such as the move towards out-of-area interventions (as in Afghanistan and Libya) have coexisted with medium term changes (such as the adoption of new strategic concepts), and with long-term patterns such as the civilisational defence of the North Atlantic.8 Temporality thus helps to establish a relation between the two referent objects of security that are at the core of this investigation – civilisation and individuals. On the one hand, the Individualisation of Security represents a medium term normative change, as a conjunctural paradigm of international security defined by NATO’s different military interventions. On the other hand, the Individualisation of Security needs to be related to the Alliance’s long duration objectives such as the civilisation of its people. Ultimately, by considering these three levels of temporality when analysing NATO, it will be possible to highlight how its historical evolution as an organisation occurred along with the evolution of mentalities, and perceptions of the world. Taken together, these perspectives will help reconstituting a much more complete and comprehensive analysis of NATO’s referents of security.

# Links

## NATO

### Link—NATO—2NC

**NATO is aimed at the subversion and control of the forces of decolonization – it is a mechanism of the informal empire of racial globalization**

Fraser 13 (Cary, Former President of the University of Belize in Central America & current Associate Professor of Political Science, Decolonization and the Cold War, Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, 1/2013, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/345084571.pdf, accessed 7-6-2022, GDI – LH)

Decolonization was thus both a response to the globalization of European influence and a process of globalization that paved the way for the dismantling of the North Atlantic centered international system. It was driven simultaneously by imperatives of imperial deconstruction and the constitution/reconstruction of sovereignty in the former colonies. However, scholars also need to give greater thought to the ways in which decolonization was both reflective of the rise of nationalist sentiment and a process that was larger than the relationship between the imperial powers and their respective colonies. Future scholarship will need to be attentive to the international and transnational dimensions of decolonization as a global process. There is much to be said about the ways in which the diplomatic initiatives of new nations such as India, Indonesia, and Egypt that emerged after 1945 helped to mobilize resources and develop strategies to accelerate and expand the opportunities for the decolonization process by way of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth Group of Nations linking the former British colonies, and other multilateral fora. Similarly, the role of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba in providing military supplies, military advisors, and, on occasion, combat units to nationalist movements challenging the colonial powers helped to accelerate the decolonization process after 1945. Decolonization was part of the shifting terrain of international relations and a factor in the calculus of the global balance of power. In addition, the decolonization process helped to create avenues of political mobilization within the imperial centers which opened opportunities for coalitions supportive of decolonization to engage and influence policy at home and in the wider international system. In Britain, the Labour Party became a major factor in pushing the process of decolonization, while the Communist and Socialist parties played similar roles in France. The rise of the American civil rights movement, which challenged the domestic racial regime, had a catalytic effect upon the national liberation struggles in various African countries. In turn, the rise of independent states in Africa forced American policymakers to recognize the paradox of its claim to “leadership of the Free World.” As a consequence, the American racial regime became a casualty of the cold war and decolonization after 1945. This interactive effect between the struggle for national liberation in colonies across the international system and the impetus for social and political change in other societies is, perhaps, best represented in the ways in which Gandhi's advocacy of nonviolence to challenge both South African race policies and British colonial rule in India helped to frame the civil rights struggle in the United States. The transnational activism that shaped the decolonization process had a “domino effect” that required new avenues of collaboration among the colonial powers for policies aimed at preventing, slowing, and/or defining the process of decolonization during the cold war. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not simply about a mutual security pact that provided an American commitment to the defense of Western Europe—it was also a mechanism used to develop coordinated strategies for dealing with the decolonization process in the non-European world. In the 1950s, America helped France contain the communist insurgency in Vietnam as a way to maintain a French commitment to the containment of the Soviet Union in Europe. Similarly, America premised its support for the Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa on the need to maintain access to military bases in the Azores for American military oper- ations within the NATO alliance. NATO represented an alliance of the European colonial powers with the United States that influenced the process of decolonization after 1945. As a consequence NATO, as one of the major alliance systems in the cold war, became a vehicle for the expansion of America's “informal empire” on the global stage and symbolized the Western Alliance's commitment to maintaining the politics of racial supremacy that had underpinned the pre-1945 global order.

#### US-led postwar institutional architectures like NATO are the police arm of the global flow of wealth to the West. Their purpose is to stave off the forces of radical economic reform

PARMAR 18 [INDERJEET, Professor of International Politics, “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, International Affairs, 2018, google scholar, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/1/151/4762690?login=true, Accessed 6 July 2022, GDI-LR]

Ikenberry’s benign interpretation of the US-led order is read back into the activities between 1939 and 1945 of elite planners of the postwar order. Developing the ‘Grand Area’ concept, planners in the State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) identified the world zones the United States ‘required’ in order to avoid having to radically reform its economy—zones that together encompassed practically the whole world.56 The key point elided is that it was to cohere that imperial ‘Grand Area’ that so much of the institutional architecture of western power was built—the IMF and World Bank, the UN, the Marshall Plan, GATT and NATO.57 The interrelations between the Grand Area’s regions were never envisaged as being in any sense equal—raw materials would flow towards western reconstruction and social peace, and finished industrial goods in the other direction. The postwar settlement at home that coalesced, as Hogan argues,58 around high-technology capital-intensive industries, international finance and organized skilled labour, was located within an international settlement that secured broad corporate interests under the auspices of an interventionist state. And, in that respect, America’s military capacity to police flows of goods across the world was at the very least a part of the reason why the United States acquired ‘forward bases in Asia and Europe’.59 As policy-makers such as Henry Stimson and John J. McCloy noted, American and western well-being relied on ‘“open markets, access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines”’.60 CFR and State Department wartime planning was therefore driven above all by a vision of global–imperial leadership exercised by US elites, strongly supported by Britain’s ruling elites, via an international order of organizations and relationships.61 The aim was, acting in concert with Britain’s elites, to resurrect European Great Powers by means including the restoration of shattered colonial trading and economic and financial linkages. The Marshall Plan viewed European reconstruction in just that global context.62 The UN was envisaged as a key international agency for American imperial internationalism, at least in its earliest days63—and, as its role in the making of South Korea shows, it remains the official basis of America’s role in that country today. And, as I will show below, the building of a hegemonic multilateral order indicates the significance of a Gramsci–Kautsky synthesis.

#### The United States throughout its entire history has been an imperialist power and now uses NATO as then mechanism to maintain their empire.

Sachs 16 (Jeffrey D. University Professor and Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, The fatal expense of American imperialism, Boston Globe, 10/30/2016, https://www3.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/10/30/the-fatal-expense-american-imperialism/teXS2xwA1UJbYd10WJBHHM/story.html?arc404=true, accessed 7/8/2022, GDI - LH)

It is nearly a truism that US wars of regime change have rarely served America’s security needs. Even when the wars succeed in overthrowing a government, as in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Moammar Khadafy in Libya, the result is rarely a stable government, and is more often a civil war. A “successful” regime change often lights a long fuse leading to a future explosion, such as the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected government and installation of the autocratic Shah of Iran, which was followed by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In many other cases, such as the US attempts (with Saudi Arabia and Turkey) to overthrow Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, the result is a bloodbath and military standoff rather than an overthrow of the government.. .  WHAT IS THE DEEP motivation for these profligate wars and for the far-flung military bases that support them? From 1950 to 1990, the superficial answer would have been the Cold War. Yet America’s imperial behavior overseas predates the Cold War by half a century (back to the Spanish American War, in 1898) and has outlasted it by another quarter century. America’s overseas imperial adventures began after the Civil War and the final conquests of the Native American nations. At that point, US political and business leaders sought to join the European empires — especially Britain, France, Russia, and the newly emergent Germany — in overseas conquests. In short order, America grabbed the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Panama, and Hawaii, and joined the European imperial powers in knocking on the doors of China. As of the 1890s, the United States was by far the world’s largest economy, but until World War II, it took a back seat to the British Empire in global naval power, imperial reach, and geopolitical dominance. The British were the unrivaled masters of regime change — for example, in carving up the corpse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Yet the exhaustion from two world wars and the Great Depression ended the British and French empires after World War II and thrust the United States and Russia into the forefront as the two main global empires. The Cold War had begun. The economic underpinning of America’s global reach was unprecedented. As of 1950, US output constituted a remarkable 27 percent of global output, with the Soviet Union roughly a third of that, around 10 percent. The Cold War fed two fundamental ideas that would shape American foreign policy till now. The first was that the United States was in a struggle for survival against the Soviet empire. The second was that every country, no matter how remote, was a battlefield in that global war. While the United States and the Soviet Union would avoid a direct confrontation, they flexed their muscles in hot wars around the world that served as proxies for the superpower competition. Over the course of nearly a half century, Cuba, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Iran, Namibia, Mozambique, Chile, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and even tiny Granada, among many others, were interpreted by US strategists as battlegrounds with the Soviet empire. Often, far more prosaic interests were involved. Private companies like United Fruit International and ITT convinced friends in high places (most famously the Dulles brothers, Secretary of State John Foster and CIA director Allen) that land reforms or threatened expropriations of corporate assets were dire threats to US interests, and therefore in need of USled regime change. Oil interests in the Middle East were another repeated cause of war, as had been the case for the British Empire from the 1920s. These wars destabilized and impoverished the countries involved rather than settling the politics in America’s favor. The wars of regime change were, with few exceptions, a litany of foreign policy failure. They were also extraordinarily costly for the United States itself. The Vietnam War was of course the greatest of the debacles, so expensive, so bloody, and so controversial that it crowded out Lyndon Johnson’s other, far more important and promising war, the War on Poverty, in the United States. The end of the Cold War, in 1991, should have been the occasion for a fundamental reorientation of US guns-versus-butter policies. The occasion offered the United States and the world a “peace dividend,” the opportunity to reorient the world and US economy from war footing to sustainable development. Indeed, the Rio Earth Summit, in 1992, established sustainable development as the centerpiece of global cooperation, or so it seemed. The far smarter approach will be to maintain America’s defensive capabilities but end its imperial pretensions. Alas, the blinders and arrogance of American imperial thinking prevented the United States from settling down to a new era of peace. As the Cold War was ending, the United States was beginning a new era of wars, this time in the Middle East. The United States would sweep away the Soviet-backed regimes in the Middle East and establish unrivalled US political dominance. Or at least that was the plan.. . . THE QUARTER CENTURY since 1991 has therefore been marked by a perpetual US war in the Middle East, one that has destabilized the region, massively diverted resources away from civilian needs toward the military, and helped to create mass budget deficits and the buildup of public debt. The imperial thinking has led to wars of regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria, across four presidencies: George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. **The same thinking has induced the United States to expand NATO to Russia’s borders,** despite the fact that NATO’s supposed purpose was to defend against an adversary — the Soviet Union — that no longer exists. Former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev has emphasized that eastward NATO expansion “was certainly a violation of the spirit of those declarations and assurances that we were given in 1990,” regarding the future of East-West security. There is a major economic difference, however, between now and 1991, much less 1950. At the start of the Cold War, in 1950, the United States produced around 27 percent of world output. As of 1991, when the Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz dreams of US dominance were taking shape, the United States accounted for around 22 percent of world production. By now, according to IMF estimates, the US share is 16 percent, while China has surpassed the United States, at around 18 percent. By 2021, according to projections by the International Monetary Fund, the United States will produce roughly 15 percent of global output compared with China’s 20 percent. The United States is incurring massive public debt and cutting back on urgent public investments at home in order to sustain a dysfunctional, militarized, and costly foreign policy. Thus comes a fundamental choice. The United States can vainly continue the neoconservative project of unipolar dominance, even as the recent failures in the Middle East and America’s declining economic preeminence guarantee the ultimate failure of this imperial vision. If, as some neoconservatives support, the United States now engages in an arms race with China, we are bound to come up short in a decade or two, if not sooner. The costly wars in the Middle East — even if continued much less enlarged in a Hillary Clinton presidency — could easily end any realistic hopes for a new era of scaled-up federal investments in education, workforce training, infrastructure, science and technology, and the environment. The far smarter approach will be to maintain America’s defensive capabilities but end its imperial pretensions. This, in practice, means cutting back on the far-flung network of military bases, ending wars of regime change, avoiding a new arms race (especially in next-generation nuclear weapons), and engaging China, India, Russia, and other regional powers in stepped-up diplomacy through the United Nations, especially through shared actions on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, including climate change, disease control, and global education. Many American conservatives will sneer at the very thought that the United States’ room for maneuver should be limited in the slightest by the UN. But think how much better off the United States would be today had it heeded the UN Security Council’s wise opposition to the wars of regime change in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Many conservatives will point to Vladimir Putin’s actions in Crimea as proof that diplomacy with Russia is useless, without recognizing that it was NATO’s expansion to the Baltics and its 2008 invitation to Ukraine to join NATO, that was a primary trigger of Putin’s response. In the end, the Soviet Union bankrupted itself through costly foreign adventures such as the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and its vast over-investment in the military. Today the United States has similarly over-invested in the military, and could follow a similar path to decline if it continues the wars in the Middle East and invites an arms race with China. It’s time to abandon the reveries, burdens, and self-deceptions of empire and to invest in sustainable development at home and in partnership with the rest of the world.

### Link—NATO Security

#### NATO’s conception of “security” is unconsciously structured by a racialized drive to secure the future for the civilizational identify of North Atlantic people.

**da Mota**, PhD in IR at University of Coimbra, **2016** (Sarah Carreira, "NATO: upholding Civilisation, protecting Individuals. The unconscious dimension of international security," University of Coimbra, September 2016, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

Heidrun Friese (2006: 298) has referred to three complex dimensions composing the notion of “cultural identiy”: (1) the unchangeable structure of things, that which is seen to constitute the nature, or the essence, of things across time and historical transformations; (2) the relations human beings have with themselves and others, involving their intentions, actions, experiences, dreams and memories, although “‘selfhood’ might have been cast throughout history; (3) the historical references to shifting relations between human beings, to concepts of belonging, and a common and shared (symbolic) world, values and language, an inclusive ‘We’ differing from an exclusive ‘Them’. Put in other words, the civilisational identity as defined by O’Hagan (2002) and the civilisational sense of history as conceived by Gress (1998) are cultural, as they display the same basic feature of a transcendent sense of naturality across time, defining both Selfhood and Otherness around a core of metaphysical elements. Globally, these considerations on the West do not bring much tangibility to the matter. More importantly, they reinforce the need to question the presence of an unconscious dimension in the perception of the West as a civilisation. To what extent does this unconscious dimension of knowledge, with its latent and invisible meanings, influence the contemporary sense of international security as conveyed by NATO? First, NATO is a political and military alliance, whose chief goals consist of the collective defence of its members. In the preamble NATO’s founding treaty, it is thus established that the Parties [a]re determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (NATO, 1949). In this statement, the referent object of the Alliance’s action – what is to be secured – is clearly collective, and united by a shared representation of history and civilisation. Ab origine and formally, NATO’s raison d’être does not seem to depend on a conceptual category such as the individual. “Individual liberty” is indeed mentioned, but it still appears as a valuing principle of a collective referent. “Civilisation” surges as the primordial referent of the defensive and protective mission that the new alliance was committing to (NATO, 1949). As in any other international organisation, NATO’s mission and identity from then on would depend on the strength of the concepts, ideas and norms used to formulate its existence. Throughout sixty years of existence, NATO has crossed two distinct ideological eras, each one with a different influence on the geopolitical division of the world. It also had to respond and adapt to deep questioning periods from the international community (Barany and Rauchhause, 2011; Kay, 1998; Zorgbibe, 2002). Again, NATO is a political and military organisation that primarily exists to promote the defence and security of the “civilisation of its people”. It is noteworthy that NATO was not proposing to safeguard the existence of its people, but rather their very attributes, which it identifies as “liberty”, a “common heritage”, and “civilisation”. If, to NATO, these very attributes precede the importance of the people’s very existence, then the existence of the people ultimately depends on the safeguard of those attributes. Therefore, if the people of the North Atlantic Treaty see themselves deprived of their liberty, and if their common heritage and civilisation are somehow destroyed, will they cease to exist? The physical integrity of a human collective may tragically subsist, even though it does not enjoy liberty. Transcontinental slavery is an example that marks the history of many Western countries between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Besides, can a human collective endure if its common heritage, or civilisation, disappears? As the extinction of ancient civilisations shows, individual elements may survive physically, but not the idea, the identity of the collective they belong to, with all its specific anthropological characteristics – social organisation, natural and food resources management, relational dynamics, etc. Extinguished ancient civilisations subsist today mainly in historical memory and material remains. Therefore, one may assume that NATO’s primordial referent of security, that is, what was decisive for the organisation to emerge, and what it aims at defending and protecting, consists of the attributes it identifies as being vital. NATO’s referent of security consists of a metaphysical entity that overcomes all institutional models, boundaries, specific historical temporalities, because it refers to such a broad idea as civilisation. It refers in fact to a “civilisational identity” (O’Hagan, 2002). Although specific values such as democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are evoked, they do emerge in a position that is subordinated to that of civilisation as its foundation, as guiding norms for the execution of civilisational defence. Therefore, and in the light of the premise that security has become a metaphysical field (Burgess, 2011), characterising most of interinstitutional and interpersonal relations of the twentieth century, NATO constitutes an object of study of excellence. It is thus a product of the West, declaredly oriented at protecting the civilisation of the North-Atlantic people (NATO, 1949).

#### NATO security policies are premised on the universalization and preservation a static and ahistorical notion of Western culture, increasing militarism and re-securitization of international politics

**da Mota**, PhD in IR at University of Coimbra, **2016** (Sarah Carreira, "NATO: upholding Civilisation, protecting Individuals. The unconscious dimension of international security," University of Coimbra, September 2016, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

Michael C. Williams (2007) has demonstrated how, after the Cold War, there was a return of culture, in an appeal to the triumph of Western culture, of the universality of its liberal values, ideals and institutions. To Williams, cultural practices have been central in the transformations of the USA’s and EU’s security policies, as well as in NATO’s evolution. The cultural dimension of security revealed as a new strategy, a new basis for a new set of power relations: By defining security in terms of forms of culture, itself a generative product of the habitus prevailing in Western security institutions, the field of security was transformed into one where cultural and symbolic forms of capital became vital – and one in which these forms of capital were dominantly possessed by Western states, societies, and security organizations (Williams, 2007: 40). To Stefano Guzzini, the post-Cold War debate about the “West” is rather connected to the revival of geopolitical thought. As Guzzini argues, that revival should not be understood as a “normal” consequence of the end of the Cold War, but rather as “[a]n answer to, or an easy fix for, the sense of dis-orientation and foreign policy identity crises which followed 1989” (2015: 5). In Guzzini’s argument, not only are “re-identification” and politics of representation at the centre of the revitalisation of the “West”, as they have negatively contributed to increased militarism and to the re-securitisation of international politics, and ultimately, to a “[v]ision of an exclusionary Fortress West” (ibid.). So, Lippmann’s (1941) apprehensions during WWII that Western civilisation was failing in making its values endure, and the resurgence of the West in the 1990’s, tell us that periods of war and political instability, or uncertainty, may have a determining effect on the reappearance of the fear that civilisation, or civilisational world order, might be under threat. However, the possibility of viewing time differently as a sequence of historical moments and evolutive trends was replaced by the predominance of cultural concerns or, at the other extreme, by cultural coverture and fortification. This is why references to Western civilisation in literature on NATO generally focus on the post-Cold War period only, which results in a static, stable and self-reproducing view of civilisation, conceptualised as being independent of any structural context, thus reinforcing culturalist representations. This can be seen, for example, in Peter Van Ham’s assessment of “whether the cultural glue ostensibly keeping ‘the West’ together remains strong enough to endure post-Cold War transatlantic tensions” (2001: 394), which takes Huntington’s concept of civilisation as a conceptual basis. Likewise, the possible outcomes of civilisation on NATO’s security policies – just as the Individualisation of Security, for instance – have not been equated either.

### Link—NATO Humanitarianism

#### Constructions of NATO within a humanitarian frame normalizes militarism through the individualization of security. It decentralizes violence throughout the globe.

**da Mota**, PhD in IR at University of Coimbra, **2016** (Sarah Carreira, "NATO: upholding Civilisation, protecting Individuals. The unconscious dimension of international security," University of Coimbra, September 2016, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

Civilisation is both a conscious and unconscious phenomenon, as it lies in complex ways between the self-conscious representation of a particular entity such as the West, and the unconscious knowledge, or interiorisation, of timeless values and perceptions. Hence, when NATO (1949) evoked the defence and permanence of a civilisation in its founding treaty, it was not only referring to the safeguard of a shared historical past, of a series of political achievements, of a mentality, a specific vision of the world, a cultural and identity bound, as it was also referring to a normative acquis. In turn, this acquis is the contemporary result of a gradual evolution of persons and ideas, from the past to the moment of NATO’s emergence as an organisation. By doing this primordial and defining reference to civilisation, NATO correlated another fundamental idea, that is, security (Coker, 2002). NATO’s relation to civilisation is thus simultaneously one of representation, in that it embodies the civilisation of one region of the world, and also a relation of operationalisation, as a tool of and for civilisational defence. In this study, NATO’s primordial relation to civilisation is confronted to the most decisive and influential normative trend in post-Cold War international security, which I term the “Individualisation of Security”. The expression “Individualisation of Security” per se should not be interpreted as a naïve or simplistic apology of the individual; it is rather used to describe the political process of transformative discourses and practices using individualistic valuations of human societies in relation to the state. As it will be seen, the Individualisation of Security consists of the new visibility given by political actors to a referent object of security other than the state, i.e., the individual. Progressively, the Individualisation of Security has re-oriented security policies and their related discourses and rationales from the state to the individual. Furthermore, it also expresses a tangible security practice, from the moment it determines how security policies are directed, involving not only its referent object, as its subject of security as well (Booth, 2005; Walker, 1997). 4 Conceptually, this trend emerging after the Cold War was associated to the notions of “human security”, “humanitarianism”, and “human development”, because of the actions undertaken by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). These entities gradually internalised in their discourses and policies the idea that protecting individual lives should come first, or before the state (Kaldor et al., 2004; UNDP, 1994). Those notions were indeed very well received and adopted in the codes of conduct of many international organisations, NGO’s, and foreign policies of some states such as Canada, Norway and Japan – in particular human security (Ramel, 2003; Suhrke, 1999). Along this line, in 2001, the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was also formulated in the reports of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001), and endorsed as a doctrine at the UN World Summit in 2005 by UN member states. R2P has offered a more institutional expression to some unanimous yet non-binding premises articulated around the responsibility to protect the populations from top four inhumane crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This overall movement thus followed the norm “life cycle” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), as we may verify the emergence of the norm, its acceptance and internalisation. 5 Security was therefore individualised through a normative change in the way of thinking and practising security, by focusing on the argument in favour of protecting the individual in contexts of violence, repression, or persecution by a state. Within NATO, the Individualisation of Security was put into practice since its military participation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) between 1992 and 1995, and opened a precedent for ulterior humanitarian interventions. This normative transformation was significant to the Alliance, and served the purpose of its institutional reinvention after the Cold War. With its intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NATO definitely reinforced the importance of individual security in its discourses, as well as human security and human rights. This represents a move from the idea of collective defence that prevailed in the strategic conception of NATO operations during the Cold War to global security (ICISS, 2001; Whitman, 2000). More recently, NATO’s intervention in Libya was justified by a reiterated concern over deterring the attacks of Muammar Gadhafi’s regime on civilians (NATO, 2011), legally drawing on the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2009. In this context, the numerous references to “the protection of civilians” showed and reaffirmed the Alliance’s penchant towards humanitarian interventions, guided by ethical and moral purposes, and a specific mandate to that end (NATO, 2011). More broadly, the Individualisation of Security suggests the rising of a cosmopolitan consciousness, in which the realisation of human interdependence, or interconnectedness, leads states to act in territories other than their own, in a sort of decentralising process of the original monopolistic state. In theory, a new norm does not necessarily imply that it is automatically opted, for it must compete with pre-existing norms, in a political process in which forms of power and coalitions intertwine (Jepperson et al., 1996). However, the life cycle of the Individualisation of Security indicates that there has been a transformation of behaviour in both individuals and international society, whereby humanitarian reasoning seems to have taken predominance in the decade following the end of the Cold War. Indeed, in the period between the end of the Cold War and the international military presence in Afghanistan after 9/11, the Individualisation of Security has produced a general discourse of discipline and normalisation, according to which a political-military conduct respective of individuals was progressively assumed to be natural for all states.

### Link—NATO Enlargement

#### NATO enlargement relies itself on promotion of pervasive liberal democratic norms and values to enable enlightenment

Kuus 2007 (Merje, political geographer studying epistemology of institutions, "'Love, Peace and Nato': Imperial Subject-Making in Central Europe," Antipode, Vol. 39, Issue 2, pg. 269-290, March 2007, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

NATO has been legitimized on the basis of “values” since its inception. Created as a defense alliance against Soviet communism, NATO was traditionally linked to the notions of democracy and freedom. In the post-Cold War era, as arguments about Soviet threat were no longer sufficient, values became the discursive pillar of NATO’s existence and enlargement.6 The remarks of US Secretary of State Powell (2004), spoken when welcoming new members to the Alliance, are instructive of the shift:

My friends, for most of its existence, NATO has been concerned mainly with the defense of common territory. NATO is now transformed, as only a league of democracies can be, into an alliance concerned mainly with the defense of common values and common ideas.

NATO was determined, above all, to prevent aggression. Now it is determined, above all, to promote freedom, to extend the reach of liberty, and to deepen the peace.

NATO’s Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer echoed this point at NATO’s Istanbul summit that same year:

We’re defending values ... And I think they should be defended every single day and every single hour. We see examples of that everywhere around that NATO is—it’s about values, has always been about values, and it’s still about values (The White House 2004).

It is a clich´e now that NATO’s post-Cold War enlargements were motivated by the desire in both East and West to make Europe “whole and free”, to reunite and secure the continent as a community of common identity or values. In both the member and the applicant states, it became common sense and indeed obligatory to say that NATO has contributed to “expanding liberal–democratic norms and values” in Central Europe. NATO was cast as a tool for an array of civilian issues such as inter-state relations (“democracies do not fight”), democracy (“NATO stabilizes domestic politics”) economic growth (“NATO membership improves a country’s investment rating”) or minority rights (NATO membership “assures” the majority of its secure position in the state and simultaneously “encourages” the minority to integrate) (see Moore 2003; Schimmelfennig 2000). Garton Ash (2002) indeed remarks that EU and NATO enlargements were “the driving forces” in the democratization and pacification of “the other half of Europe”. A veritable cottage industry now documents NATO’s “good deeds” in Europe. Central European countries certainly carefully consider NATO positions on issues like minority rights and civil–military relations, and NATO certainly has contributed to stabilizing conflict zones such as parts of the former Yugoslavia (Dahlman and O’Tuathail 2005). The point here is not to deny this influence, but to expose and problematize a particular inscription of morality and causality: the presumption that it was obviously because of NATO’s good moral influence that we do not hear of widespread regional instability or human rights abuses in Central Europe. The value-based framing of NATO was important in enabling enlargement. With NATO as wholesome and good as “motherhood and apple pie” (Grudzinski and van Ham 1999), it became difficult for any group or state to oppose enlargement—lest it be cast as an outsider to “European values” (Williams and Neumann 2000).7

This narrative of NATO enlightened and good is especially pervasive in Central Europe, where it enframes virtually all utterances of security, defense, and foreign policy more broadly (Oas 2005). Across the region and throughout the integration process, NATO membership was cast in dramatic and existential terms as integral parts of the region’s return to its European home. The pro-NATO lobby did not imply a threat to NATO’s member or candidate states. It conceived of membership not as an answer to strategic issues but as a reward for and a marker of “sameness” with the west on the basis of “values” (Popescu 2005:461). As Polish Foreign Minister Geremek put it in 1997: “We have spared no effort to return to the roots of our culture and statehood ... to join the Euro-Atlantic family of democratic nations. This is the essence of our aspirations to join NATO”. The alliance, he continued, “has managed to pit its immense military might in services of fundamental values and principles that we share. NATO can make Europe safe for democracy. No other organization can make Europe safe for democracy” (quoted in Moore 2003:64). Estonia’s Foreign Minister Ilves (1996) likewise stressed that NATO membership would codify “common values—peace, freedom, democracy and welfare—which Estonia values above all”. He indeed explicitly distanced NATO aspirations from the notion of threat, declaring a year later that “Estonia does not want to join the NATO of the Cold War. In both location and spirit Estonia is a part of the new Europe and we feel entitled to be constructively involved in the formation of the new European defence arrangement” (Ilves 1997). Czech President Havel (2002a) argued that NATO has a cultural “valuebased” and “civilizational” identity alongside its geographic and strategic identity because the alliance was designed to defend certain values, such as political order, human rights, the rule of law, market economy, freedom of expression, and so on. Bulgaria’s President Stoyanov stressed in 1998 that his country’s NATO aspirations represented a “civilizational choice”. “For us”, Stoyanov said, “it is a strongly motivated choice, a cultural choice, a choice of civilization” (quoted in Todorova 2003:230). That country’s next President Parvanov (2004) echoes this claim, emphasizing that NATO membership was important not only as a security guarantee but also, and “more importantly”, as a recognition that Bulgaria subscribes to the values of democracy.8 The narrative is a productive one. Linking NATO membership to acceptance by, and agency in, the international system, it constitutes that membership as an essential attribute of political subjectivity.

#### Enlargement relies on integration of NATO in individual social life – enables twin processes of militarization and imperial rights production

Kuus 2007 (Merje, political geographer studying epistemology of institutions, "'Love, Peace and Nato': Imperial Subject-Making in Central Europe," Antipode, Vol. 39, Issue 2, pg. 269-290, March 2007, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

Beyond Central Europe, the paper illuminates the twin processes of militarization and the production of imperial right. Both processes are at their core concerned with subject-making. NATO enlargement, I argue, was based not merely on ignoring the public. It was also based on making NATO into an unremarkable and integral part of social life. Accession was effected not though negative categories of threat but through positive narratives of fully fledged politically active western subjects. It locates geopolitics at the scale of individual action and individual identity. The accession discourse produces NATO membership as a state’s precondition for being—as a requirement for being recognized as a modern, mature western subject. It constitutes NATO not just in terms of state action, but also in terms of individual responsibility and individual emotions. It constitutes the military–industrial–media– entertainment complex not simply as necessary or inevitable but also as morally good. Within it, accession is not something that happens to people, that is imposed on the electorate for “reasons of the state”. It is a constructive process that emphasizes the participation of individuals and social groups. Recall the Birth-Day dance in the Prague Castle, the references to responsible and reliable subjects, the proclamations on a new beginning, freedom, and openness, the calls for a proactive participation and emotional involvement in security, and the emphasis on children and youth. The process is not concerned merely with putting individuals into the service of power. It rather seeks to integrate individuals into its very functioning. It works by enlarging the unremarkable realms of consensus that underpin the normative space of imperial right.

### 2NC NATO—History Structures Implementation

#### Hegemonic forms of knowledge unconsciously shape NATO’s perceptions of collective security. The good intentions of the Aff cannot change the ways the plan would be implemented.

**da Mota**, PhD in IR at University of Coimbra, **2016** (Sarah Carreira, "NATO: upholding Civilisation, protecting Individuals. The unconscious dimension of international security," University of Coimbra, September 2016, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

The above-quoted historian Fernand Braudel (1958) speaks of the “unconscious history” – l’histoire inconsciente – that is, the history that overcomes the duration of a single event in the most transcendent ways, and carries with it some imperceptible meanings that travel across time. This invisible and latent form of history suggests that we have an unconscious perception of who we are, and of what we are doing, independently of our specific temporal location. However, this unconsciousness mostly relates to the perspective of short duration, i.e., of “micro-time” (Braudel, 1958: 739), as short-term insights may veil our awareness in perceiving history more widely. This implies, on the contrary, that when we think of history in macro-time, or longer duration, the perception we have of it is rather conscious. Or, as suggested by Reinhart Koselleck (2004) in Futures Past: on the semantics of historical time: There certainly are also structures which are so enduring that they remain for contemporaries part of the unconscious or the unknown, or whose transformation is so slow that it escapes their awareness. In these cases, only social science or history as a science of the past can provide information that goes beyond the perceptible experience of given generations (Koselleck, 2004: 108). The present research arises from a fundamental concern over how hegemonic forms of knowledge have shaped not only collective perceptions and representations of the world and its history in a way that dismisses the importance of this unconscious history, but also how they have influenced their very becoming. More specifically, this concern is related to the direct impact those forms of knowledge may have on the prevailing readings and practices of contemporary international security. The work undertaken in this research focuses on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as an object of study, in which the unconscious dimension of history is fundamentally questioned and searched for in relation to international security. The pertinence of NATO to this endeavour draws upon the fact that alliances use to be temporary and last only as long there is a specific threat to combat (Wendt, 1994). Yet, that is not NATO’s case, for it has evolved from an alliance into a community, and also from focusing on one specific threat to unspecific risks (Adler, 2008; Coker, 2002; Mozaffari, 2002: 30; NATO, 1991). In fact, it has managed to overcome its original compromise towards the safeguard of the civilisation of its people (NATO, 1949), up until the more contemporary point of committing to protecting individuals outside its original area of intervention (NATO, 2011). Therefore, this study interrogates to what extent the seemingly natural evolution of NATO’s referent object of security – what it aims at securing – may be framed by unconscious processes.2 The overall objective is to understand in more depth the dynamics composing the still underexplored relationship within security studies, and more broadly within International Relations (IR), between the idea of civilisation and the place of individuality in it. 3 This will be done by making visible how the security of civilisation and the Individualisation of Security have been (interrelatedly) conceptualised and practiced throughout NATO’s evolution. The goal of this conceptual and practical confrontation is to display an interdisciplinary interpretation – IR, political science, sociology, security studies, history, philosophy, psychology – of the actual importance of the individual to the becoming of human societies, as well as the importance of structural action upon this very becoming.

## LIO

### Link—LIO—1NC

#### Liberal internationalism is a racialized and class-based ideological system that fails to accurately describe the world and is aimed at justifying Western global imperialism. Its defenders refuse to acknowledge studies that refute its core underlying assumptions.

PARMAR 18 [INDERJEET, Professor of International Politics, “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, International Affairs, 2018, google scholar, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/1/151/4762690?login=true>, Accessed 6 July 2022, GDI-LR]

As an IR theory, the key pillars of liberalism, as embodied in liberal societies, are limited government, individual freedom, private property, pluralism and tolerance, progress, institutions and cooperation for peace, and interdependence. As a theory of US foreign policy, which is the object of analysis here, it encompasses democratic values, economic interdependence, international institutions as a framework for cooperation in addressing global crises and problems, and the broad promotion of general welfare. Emerging historically from the era of rising anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, with the United States and Britain in the lead, the US-led order laid claims to being opposed to colonial rule, and in favour of national and human rights, within a system of international power undergirded by rules binding hegemon and others alike. It was promoted not as a continuation of empire by other means, but as a new system based on universalistic principles applicable to all regardless of race, colour or history. For my immediate purposes, it is unnecessary to disentangle the positive from the normative, the theoretical from the practical, because this framework of thought emerges both from deep principles and also as a set of solutions to international problems, especially world wars. Hence, liberal internationalism is frequently referred to as Wilsonianism, after the internationalist programme promulgated by US President Woodrow Wilson after the First World War that included the formation of the League of Nations, the forerunner of the longer-lasting post-1945 United Nations system. I argue here that, as a theory, it operates as ideological legitimation even when its proponents offer reform; it justifies the status quo. In that regard it differs little overall from other theories like Marxism, for example, or realism. But because it is the principal system of ideas and practices, and ideals, that are used to explain, implement and defend the present international status quo, I would suggest that it elides too much to be fully validated beyond the circle of its proponents. Of course, it explains aspects of the world’s functioning; but its interpretation tends to be benign: crises and challenges are explained as resolvable within the system’s governing principles through socialization, integration and assimilation. I use the term liberal internationalism, then, as an amalgam to suggest that, while it is all of the above, upon reflection it serves within academia and in IR as a positive theory of how things actually are—that is, as the opposite of an ideology. It purports to be able to explain the world, at the same time as its adherents are normative supporters of the theory. I show that it is actually ideological, because it elides key factors of how the liberal world order actually works, and that other theories suggest better ways of explaining the world. In the next section of the article, I analyse liberal internationalist ideas and claims in more depth and more critically, with a view to identifying key elements of a more viable framework to explain the LIO—a critical theory influenced by the work of Antonio Gramsci and to some extent synthesized with the work of Karl Kautsky. The principal aim of this article is to identify the weaknesses of liberal internationalism in practice with the purpose of opening space for subsequent theorizing. In sum, what appears to be missing from liberal internationalism is any recognition of domestic power inequalities—such as those based on class and race—its broad attachment to (democratic) elitism, and its hierarchical approach to other powers, especially in the global South. While Wilsonian liberal internationalism is widely recognized as privileging a belief in the free movement of people, capital, goods and services, less attention has been given to its origins in a time when ‘international relations’ was overtly understood as ‘race relations’, and its consequent implication in managing overtly racialized imperial power after the First World War.14 The Wilson administration’s role in racially segregating the US federal government had its foreign policy counterpart in a belief in an eventual, but far distant, self-government of the colonies and opposition to a Japanese proposal for a racial equality clause in the charter of the fledgling League of Nations.15 The development of liberal internationalism, then, was symbiotically bound to Wilson’s conviction that US intervention in world affairs was essential, and to what were effectively parastatal organizations created both by the federal executive and by private foundations—the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, among others. Wilsonian ‘theory’ was practical, idealistic and ideological from the very beginning. It is also the case that, long after overt racial discourses became politically damaging, subliminal racial thinking remained—and (unconsciously) remains—a significant element of liberal internationalism, affecting its analyses of the politics of domestic and global demographic power shifts.16 Nevertheless, liberal internationalists are cosmopolitans—opposed to narrow nationalism and trade protectionism, within a US-led international system. But its core ideas—rule of law, superiority of the western idea (however lightly worn), a rules-based institutional order open to all, in principle—are deeply embedded in US political-intellectual elite think-tanks, university public policy schools, corporate media and the leaderships of both main political parties,17 the core of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment.18 Importantly, however, there are influential voices in the emerging powers and regions that support the liberal international order by calling for internal reform to take account of the changing distribution of global power away from the West and towards the ‘rest’.19 The upshot is a broad consensus around certain core ideas: that the post-1945 rules-based world order, whatever its weaknesses, serves the world well by spreading prosperity and maintaining peace; and that, although it cannot continue unreformed, the US-led system draws on deep resources—economic, military, systemic and ‘soft’—that bestow upon it continuing strengths to contain, engage, manage and socialize emerging powers. Charles Kupchan lists a range of problems requiring US leadership, even if only within a suitably reformed international system reflecting ‘the real distribution of power’.20 John Ikenberry of Princeton University, the leading proponent of this school of thought, makes significant claims as well as several unquestioned assumptions, undeveloped allusions to core powers’ violent and other connections with the periphery, and a number of significant silences. He claims, for example, that the United States is a fully functioning democracy, yet fails to acknowledge evidence of the power of racialized, class-based elites. For critical theorists, such as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Craig Murphy,21 the international relations of elites across states and societies operate to reproduce extant patterns of power and manage or engineer change to the benefit of elites in a generally zero-sum game in which broad masses and lower classes lose out. This is clearly a far cry from liberal internationalist claims associated with the benefits of globalization, notwithstanding proposed ameliorative remedies against the harshest effects. Likewise, claims about the centrality of the rule of law occlude consideration of significant violations in practice. The question of imperial power is hardly addressed, and there is a general Eurocentric neglect of the significance of global areas beyond the core to the ‘welfare’ and cohesion of the core itself. There is a clear link between Ikenberry’s overt theory of American democracy and its liberal-hegemonic world role. The United States, and the western order it built, is characterized as a pluralistic liberal market democracy that is broadly inclusive and tolerant of ethnic diversity. The US-built security community exhibits its leading state’s internal character as a plural one and, very significantly, one in which the United States is bound by rules.22 Yet liberal internationalists’ underlying assumptions effectively deny the findings of numerous well-researched studies challenging American democracy’s principal claims.23 As far as Ikenberry and Deudney (and many others) are concerned, the ‘western idea’ is a significant part of the strength of the US-led order.24 The West, a spectacularly successful ‘civilizational heritage’, was underpinned by America’s New Deal liberalism, and extended globally via Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and NATO. In effect, this vision and programme aimed to defuse domestic class conflict and the threat of war through ‘activist government, political democracy, and international alliance’. That system is in principle capable of assimilating emerging powers, given the universalism of its values and its tolerance of ethnic differences, although others joining this privileged grouping are expected to conform to its rules and accept US leadership. Western order is exclusive also because special rules apply within its zone of peace. Beyond it, conversely, other rules apply—cruder, neo-imperial and violent, although the implications of this contrast are left unaddressed.25 By drawing a line around the West, Ikenberry cuts off the rest of the world while addressing questions about the sources of world order which, empirically, lie in a symbiotic relationship between core and periphery. Yet, even within the ‘greater’ West, Japan and South Korea were not accorded the same treatment as western Europe.26 The LIO really was conceived and developed as a system of the West and the rest, in a zero-sum game. As Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, noted on Twitter in May 2017, the whole point of ‘Euro-Atlanticism’ was to ‘prevent post-West world order’.27 Yet the claim persists that this is no empire, despite America’s privileged place at the top of the ‘hierarchical political order’, because its hegemony is built on ‘consent’ and bounded by law. Power, which was necessary at the creation, faded away as consensual hegemony developed. This interpretation, of course, elides America’s overwhelming military superiority, including in and over Europe. Beyond Europe, however, Ikenberry concedes that American hegemony remained hierarchical, ‘with much fainter liberal characteristics’,28 again closing off an avenue of analytical and empirical analysis that might threaten the intellectual edifice of the LIO. The (unconsciously) racialized world-view of Ikenberry’s Eurocentrism is subtly buttressed by Walter Russell Mead’s exploration of the significance of superior Anglo-Saxons who win wars, build world structures, and govern efficiently owing to ethno-cultural, not biological, characteristics.29 Mead’s interpretation of Anglo-Saxonism makes it appear benign, assimilative and universal— a scaffolding to support Ikenberry’s more overtly institutional analysis. Assimilating minorities, however, is not embracing diversity—learning from other cultures and creating something new; it is maintaining conformity to the cultures of the powerful, dominant group.30 Looking to the future, as new global powers emerge, Mead advises America to both embrace and contain them, retaining military superiority should ‘rising’ powers become ‘opponents’.31 Mead complements the prescriptions of other liberal-realist internationalists, all seeking to incorporate, assimilate and mobilize emerging powers to absorb difference and produce conformity. The liberal view is challenged by scholars who argue that the New Deal order effectively represented a political compromise, made in order to attain class peace and greater productivity, that mainly benefited major corporations while incorporating organized labour and thereby drawing its teeth. The postwar settlement was a narrow one—excluding racial minorities, unskilled and unorganized labour, and women—and relied on war and a heavily militarized economy that arose with the war in Korea and led directly to that in Vietnam.32 Liberal internationalists’ accounts elide the class, gendered and racial bases of the order, both at home and abroad. Ikenberry paints an appealing picture of a liberal order that delivered material benefits and security to all, while also raising some doubts about the operation of the system, especially with regard to the inequality of rewards generated by globalization and its potential political consequences. Those consequences are regarded by Ikenberry as posing the greatest threats to the stability of the liberal order, laying bare a central mechanism and dynamic of the system itself: market-driven class inequality, exacerbated in a society in which racialized class politics is salient.33 Yet Ikenberry never mentions class, race or gender—an omission central to critical theories of the making of the LIO.34 The other key omission is the role played in building the order by violence and outright war—not just the Second World War but also the Korean War, the ‘hot’ war at the birth of the order that propelled the formation of NATO, the rearmament of Germany, the security alliance with Japan and indeed the US military– industrial complex.35 Accordingly, a key focus of consideration here is wartime planning for a new world order and the manner of its foundation as a direct result of military violence that violated the UN Charter, international law, the lessons of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Wars ‘out there’ secured the core ‘over here’.36 And, of course, what is referred to as benign ‘liberal internationalism’ is what Mark Mazower refers to as ‘imperial internationalism’—trying to maintain a global hierarchy established by centuries of colonial and semi-colonial rule over what is now called the global South.37 Finally, the construction of the postwar western order was constitutive of a political, social, economic and ideological ‘vital center’, as Schlesinger terms it38—opposed to both right-wing nationalists and left-wing anti-imperialists. This entailed the acceptance by core forces of the ‘New Deal order’ that the price of class harmony, stability and mobility at home was the export and continuation of inequality,39 and therefore military violence, on the periphery; and that the removal of vast quantities of raw materials required a global military basing strategy, both to protect allied trade and to deny it to adversaries.40 Ikenberry accurately notes that the internal character of the leading state in the liberal order has an impact on the international system it built; but I diverge from his presentation of this impact as the externalization of a democratic regime. He elides the racial, class and gendered character of American historical, economic and political development—including that of Wilsonianism itself.41 His conclusion, however, is accurate, even if he fails to recognize its significance in the building and maintenance of the liberal order: ‘Access to resources and markets, socioeconomic stability, political pluralism, and American security interests—all were inextricably linked.’42

### Link—LIO—2NC

#### The LIO is a system of civilizational hierarchy and inequality that generates the very crises it claims to solve

PARMAR 18 [INDERJEET, Professor of International Politics, “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, International Affairs, 2018, google scholar, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/1/151/4762690?login=true, Accessed 6 July 2022, GDI-LR]

The foundational values, interests and institutions of the (Anglo-)US liberal international order, with due respect for important but not fundamental recalibrations and corrections along the way, are the sources of its current crises or at least challenges. The mentalities and power structures of the LIO’s leaders are constructed by hierarchical, imperial and racial–civilizational ways of thinking, albeit in most cases subliminally embedded to the point of being unconscious deep structures themselves.117 The American white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (Wasp) establishment built and maintained the liberal order in a ‘competitively cooperative’ alliance with their British counterparts,118 whose own imperial and racial mentalities were hardly in conflict with those of their American cousins.119 Whatever changes occurred or were forced on US elites over time, those underlying and mainly subliminal values have remained significant in decision-making, including when nurturing new states and powers such as South Korea and China. As a result, liberal internationalism as a ‘theory’ or approach to world order, eliding and skirting matters of hierarchy, race and class just as it does in its outline understandings of American democracy, misses a critical part of the picture—of the dynamics of international power as well as the dynamics of domestic power. Because of that elision, that failure to see, I suggest it is a legitimating ideology of the American ruling elite. I have argued above that the LIO is better understood as a system of hierarchy and inequality, and as what Persaud calls a ‘racio-civilizational’ phenomenon. What does that mean? It means that this system and its leaders cannot yet comprehend an order that encompasses on the basis of something approaching equality the broad mass of people—citizens—at home, let alone the non-western peoples of the global South, or even their elites. The tweet from Donald Tusk quoted above is revealing and instructive because it was addressed to President Trump in simple and stark terms, worth repeating here: ‘Euro-Atlanticism means the free world cooperating to prevent post-West world order’—so, please ‘do not touch’. International alliances of elites, including those of the emerging powers such as China, are in large part attempts to manage and channel change to prevent radical power shifts, to sustain a world order that serves elites and masses, in West and East, in starkly unequal ways. A Gramscian–Kautskyian synthesis combines consideration of domestic and international class-based imperial hegemonies and offers a good explanation of the existing order. However, it also offers a way out, in theory, and provides ways to assess the likelihood of avenues towards egalitarianism being taken by ruling elites. The prognosis is not positive at present, although the bases of ways forward appear to be coming into view as political strife and electoral shocks challenge the status quo.120

#### The LIO is a legitimizing frame for capitalist globalization – it produces systemic instability and extreme inequality that only benefits the rich and powerful

PARMAR 18 [INDERJEET, Professor of International Politics, “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, International Affairs, 2018, google scholar, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/1/151/4762690?login=true>, Accessed 6 July 2022, GDI-LR]

It is widely agreed that the US-led liberal international order (LIO) is at the very least in transition, if not in crisis.1 This article raises a number of significant questions with the aim of clarifying the current conjuncture in the US-led LIO, with particular attention to the academic ‘theory’ (liberal internationalism) that underpins the system. Above all, it asks: is liberal internationalism a legitimating ideology more than it is a description or theoretical explanation of the existing system? I explore this question by considering several specific sub-questions, the cumulative effect of which is to provide pathways to address the main issue: How did we get here? Who built the order? What were the foundational principles in theory and practice? How has the international order’s leadership managed change within it since 1945? I address these questions by considering detailed examples of actual practice by US and allied elite leadership groups at key moments: first, in conceptualizing and building the order, both during and immediately after the Second World War, by exploring the creation of the South Korean state; and second, in looking at the management of change and challenges—in particular, the (re-)emergence of China as a Great Power. Both cases are claimed by leading liberal internationalists as primary examples of the successes of the LIO: hence, examining these cases in some detail allows us to compare liberal internationalist rationales—and the stated aims of policy-makers—with historical and contemporary evidence. The overall finding is that liberal internationalist thinking/theory is, in effect (albeit unconsciously on the part of its proponents), a legitimating ideology rather than an effective explanatory frame for understanding the way in which the LIO actually works. That conclusion is reached, in part, by suggesting the applicability of a rather different perspective on the operations of the LIO and US power: specifically, a synthesized Gramscian–Kautskyian framework, explained below. The key point is that the LIO is a class-based, elitist hegemony—strongly imbued with explicit and implicit racial and colonial/imperial assumptions—in both US domestic and foreign relations. At home, this analysis helps to explain in part the phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ white working/middle class, including the affluent but economically anxious voters whose salience on the right has transformed US politics since the Reagan revolution of the 1980s.2 Responding to the (minorities’) rights revolution of the 1960s, and the loss of economic opportunity and decline in living standards due to technological change and the global redistribution of industry,3 white working- and middle-class voters drifted towards the Republicans as the party of low taxes and fiscal conservatism.4 This delivered little in material terms, however; and, as inequality increased with market freedom and real wages stagnated, workers in the ‘rust belt’ and other areas grew increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo of establishment politics, their frustration exacerbated by anxieties about ethno-racial diversity and American identity as the United States moves towards a society in which whites are a minority.5 The result was the election as president in 2016 of Donald Trump on an overtly anti-conservative and barely concealed white identity platform at home and a programme of protectionism and non-interventionism—America First—abroad.6 Yet political dissatisfaction or disaffection was not confined to the political right.7 ‘Occupy Wall Street’ and other movements and groups vented their anger at the inequalities of power, wealth and income, particularly in the wake of the Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis.8 In external policy, the analysis helps to explain the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of the US readily embracing a more diverse international order, as well as the character of that very embrace.9 Accepting nations of the global South on an equal footing may become a strategic necessity, but the process remains problematic given the racialized discourses of western power over the past several centuries, fortified in the United States by the experience of the slave trade, slavery, the ‘Jim Crow’ era, Orientalist views of Asians, and other factors.10 Class power helps to explain the strategic embrace of foreign elites as the sources of change and the agents of American influence, however diluted it may have been due to target states’ national interest considerations. Those at the apex of America’s hierarchies sought to forge alliances with and incorporate their foreign elite counterparts— with their full cooperation—in South Korea and China.11 Hence, the liberal internationalist ‘successes’ in the cases of South Korea and China must be qualified by considering the repercussions of developing market-oriented societies marked by economic inequality, rising social unrest and varying degrees of political repression. In ‘successful’ China and South Korea, as in India and other emerging powers, there remain major challenges underpinned by profound inequalities in power, wealth and income, associated with a politics that is frequently class-based but also heavily racialized and xenophobic.12 Why choose South Korea and China as key cases? Although these are two very different states, varying in global significance, and analysed at different periods of historical time, they do allow us to test out important claims made by liberal internationalists. South Korea is considered as a key test at the very birth of the US-led order—at a time when we might expect the new principles embodied in the UN, such as the rule of law, the lessons of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, the Geneva Conventions and the rights of civilians in combat zones, to be pursued with some determination if not fully achieved. Given the fervour of anti-colonialism at the time, and US claims to champion that cause, we might also expect the behaviour of the international system’s leading power to differ sharply from that of colonial rulers in what became known as the Third World. The case of South Korea tells us a great deal about the practical application of a new international system developed by US power within an international system of rules, applicable to hegemon and others alike, a key liberal internationalist claim. China’s integration into the US-led international system from the late 1970s also tells us a great deal about the character of the international order, especially about how significant change is managed within it and what the embrace of diversity means in practical terms. By the 1970s, the US-led order was facing challenges, of course—from West Germany and Japan, for example, and the oil-producing states—not to mention demands from the G77 for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and was also recovering from defeat in Vietnam and the legitimacy crisis following the Watergate scandal. For liberal internationalists, the integration of China is claimed as a success story both for the liberal order and for China. Yet, without denying the country’s dramatic increase in economic power, I question the character of China’s success, given the high levels of internal turmoil and the extremes of inequality that are giving rise to major political and economic instability. China, then, is a test of the claim that the liberal order rewards societies as a whole; a Gramscian–Kautskyian counter-argument would suggest that it is largely the Chinese ruling elite and its business allies, not the mass of ordinary Chinese, who have been accommodated in the US-led international system.

## China

### Link—China Threat

#### China threat discourses are grounded in and productive of white supremacy. The fundamental being of American self-identity requires the specter of the Chinese other

Turner 2013 [Oliver, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, “‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” *Review of International Studies* 39.4, https://bit.ly/3ofH5TD, accessed 07/11/22, GDI-ATN]

The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests that dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible . . . is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’19 As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenth century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’.21 Across the history of Sino-US relations then when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. In consequence, they have always existed as dangers to that identity. In this analysis it is argued that a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological) deemed most fundamental to its being. As such, representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States. It is demonstrated that, twice before, this discursive process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These moments were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the United States was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today’s China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated.

#### Historical and ideological understandings of China determine US “threat” assessments – policies manufacture and enable these representations

Turner 2013 [Oliver, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, “‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” *Review of International Studies* 39.4, https://bit.ly/3ofH5TD, accessed 07/11/22, GDI-ATN]

In March 2011 US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper informed the American Senate that, of all sovereign nations, China represented the most imminent ‘mortal threat’ to the United States. While China’s intentions were not necessarily malicious, he argued, it had the capacity to present such a danger. Russia was also cited but quickly dismissed as Clapper observed that China’s ‘strategic nuclear weapons’ arsenal in particular made it an issue of the foremost concern.1 China’s nuclear weapons stockpile is estimated at around 240 warheads. Russia’s stands at around 12,000.2 Yet, and despite the clear superiority of the latter’s nuclear armament, Clapper repeatedly emphasised that it was China’s capabilities and not its intent which were central in its elevation to such an extreme category of threat. Director Clapper’s assertions are reflective of the so-called China Threat Theory which now attracts considerable Western attention, especially within the United States. In the International Relations (IR) literature authors including John Mearsheimer examine US policy options towards a real or potential China threat. Mearsheimer argues that China’s growth will almost inevitably cause tensions with the United States, presenting a ‘considerable potential for war’.3 Warren Cohen predicts that China will continue to ‘brutaliz[e] the weak’, and follow great powers of the past by seeking regional dominance before expanding its influence further.4 Certainly, much of the recent literature is less foreboding of China’s ‘rise’ and authors question the extent to which it endangers international security. Gordon Chang, for example, argues that China’s economic model – and hence its capacity to become a true global superpower – is flawed.5 Brown et al. are broadly positive about China’s development, with engagement rather than containment the preferred US policy response.6 Others reject the conflation of a ‘rising’ China with a ‘dangerous’ China.7 What protagonists of both sides of the argument demonstrate in equal measure, however, is the tendency to assume that a single physical reality about China can be determined. This aim of classifying China as a threat (or indeed a non-threat) is a legacy of the historical dominance within IR of the overtly positivist neorealist and neoliberal schools.8 Positivist approaches to the discipline rely upon testable theory and empirical analysis with the expectation that the world can be definitively understood. The traditional influence of these approaches has precluded a more widespread appreciation of how, in fact, a single authoritative understanding about China is unachievable. The inherent contestability and subjectivity of judgments about that country was once noted by John King Fairbank who argued that ‘[a]t any given time the ‘‘truth’’ about China is in our heads’.9 From this understanding the existence (or absence) of a China threat cannot be satisfactorily explained with reference to material forces alone. The ‘threat’ described by Director Clapper can never be dispassionately observed through assessments of an external world, as he seemingly claimed to be able to do. The purpose of this article is not to speculate as to whether China ‘is’ or ‘is not’ a threat to the United States. It does not concern itself with China’s nuclear arsenal nor dispute the existence and expansion of its capabilities, or the possibility of there being a cause of future violence. It argues that while the material realities of China are important, the nature and extent of their importance is, and has always been, regulated by ideas. Of course, the understanding that international affairs are guided by more than the distribution of state capabilities is not original; it has long been a primary contestation of the ‘critical’, or post-positivist, IR movement that the world is mutually constitutive of material and ideational forces.10 Moreover, authors including Evelyn Goh emphasise the centrality of ideas within Sino-US relations and to the formulation of US China policy at key moments.11 Chengxin Pan specifically examines the China ‘threat’ as a discursive construction and its importance to Washington’s relations with Beijing.12 Beyond these important works the discipline remains relatively quiet on the salience of ideational forces in producing a fantasised China ‘threat’ and in enabling US policies in response.13 It also broadly fails to explain how those policies themselves reinforce the understandings which make them possible in the first place. This is the arena of enquiry towards which the article is directed. It contributes to a small but growing literature which challenges the contours of the modern day China Threat Theory, exposing it as fundamentally flawed and even potentially dangerous. It does this by demonstrating that, in many respects, today’s China ‘threat’ to US security conforms to those which have emerged before. It shows how, across the duration of Sino-US relations, China ‘threats’ have always emerged in part from representation and interpretation and thus how fears about that country today continue to be manufactured and engineered in a way not unique from those of the (sometimes distant) past. In late 2011 the Obama administration shifted its foreign policy focus from Afghanistan and Iraq to the Asia Pacific.14 To a significant extent this ‘pivot’, as it is commonly described, is motivated by the growth of China. Accordingly, as increasing concentrations of US political, economic, and military recourses are diverted to the Asian region, American perceptions of China and their significance to the enactment of Washington’s foreign policies there have once more become increasingly pertinent.

#### China threat discourses are inherently socially constructed – they justify demands for action and create self-fulfilling prophecies

Turner 2013 [Oliver, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, “‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” *Review of International Studies* 39.4, https://bit.ly/3ofH5TD, accessed 07/11/22, GDI-ATN]

The modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose how ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon. Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the United States in perceptions of external danger. They demonstrate that, regardless of China’s ability to assert material force or of the manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the reality of danger can be manufactured and made real. China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of ‘danger’ – whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign immigrants – have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found.122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China ‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms. As ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are interpreted in such a way to make them threatening, regardless of Beijing’s intentions. Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China’s identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded. Joseph Nye argues that the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous. For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective assumptions about China and the material capabilities he describes. In late 2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that ‘the American people [want] to continue to build a growing friendship and strong relationship between the peoples of China and the United States’.124 The hope, of course, is that a peaceful and cooperative future can be secured. Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary focus of Washington’s early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy, American interpretations of China must be acknowledged as a central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis of their relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and history informs us that particular American discourses of China have repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable realities about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always been inextricable from the potentialities of US China policy. As Sino-US relations become increasingly consequential the intention must be for American representations of the PRC – and indeed Chinese representations of the United States – to become the focus of more concerted scholarly attention. Only in this way can the contours of those relations be more satisfactorily understood, so that the types of historical episodes explored in this analysis might somehow be avoided in the future.

### Link—China Rise

#### Representations of a “rising China” are a socially constructed narrative of dramatic great power tensions

Turner 2013 [Oliver, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, “‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” *Review of International Studies* 39.4, https://bit.ly/3ofH5TD, accessed 07/11/22, GDI-ATN]

China’s military and economic strengths are far greater today than at any point in the history of Sino-US relations. Yet, the ‘threat’ it presents to American security is no less a social construction than in the past. The modern day proliferation of popular and academic ‘China threat’ literatures in particular is reflective of the increasingly widespread conviction that a ‘rising’ China inevitably constitutes a real or potential danger.97 Robert Kaplan explains that ‘the American military contest with China in the Pacific will define the twenty first century’.98 He does not question if or even when China might become a threat. He emphasises its inevitability. Babbin and Timperlake provide a fictional narrative of future Sino-American tensions in which, among other things, China uses cyber warfare to shut down American defence systems. The hostile scenario they present, it is argued, ‘could easily become fact . . . The Verdict: China means war.’99 Certainly, and as has been the case throughout history, China is not uniformly perceived in these terms. Among a significant proportion of the American population, however, the China ‘threat’ is an accepted and relatively unproblematic phenomenon. China now has the world’s largest population, the fastest growing economy, the largest army, the largest middle class, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a manned space program and a nuclear arsenal.100 Yet, all of these things do not necessarily make China a threat. Countries which share variations of these, notably the possession of nuclear weapons, a permanent presence in the Security Council and significant standing armies are not perceived in this way. Indeed, and as Director Clapper revealed in the Senate in early 2011, states like Russia with far greater stockpiles of nuclear weapons and significant additional military hardware can be viewed in less threatening terms, even when capability is cited as the critical factor.101 Furthermore, the PRC has had a large population and a substantial army since its founding in 1949, nuclear weapons since 1964 and a seat on the Security Council since 1971 without consistently being interpreted as a threat. Accordingly, forces additional to those of China’s capabilities must still be implicated in understandings about the dangers it is said to present.

### Link—China Cyber

#### Depictions of Chinese cyber attacks invoke an orientalist narrative that hypocritically casts China as a “threat to civilization”

Ooi 2009 [Su-Mei, associate Professor of Political Science at Butler University, "The Transnational Protection Regime and Taiwan's Democratization," *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 9.1, ebscohost, GDI-ATN]

The construction of China as potential enemy Other takes on an additional hue when we look at the depictions of China’s cyber activities—China moves from cheat to a more malicious cousin, the thief. The United States first focused on issues of “cyber warfare” in the mid-2000s to late 2000s, but at the time, the trope associated with China was not necessarily that of thief. In the mass news media, a militaristic lens framed much of the discussion, depicting China as a rule breaker flouting international norms and thus posing a security threat. For example, a Los Angeles Times article highlighted that “China in the last year has developed ways to infiltrate and manipulate computer networks around the world in what U.S. defense officials conclude is a new and potentially dangerous military capability, according to a Pentagon report” (Barnes, 2008). China is even placed in relation to al-Qaeda: “Cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage pose a greater potential danger to U.S. national security than Al Qaeda and other militants that have dominated America’s global focus since Sept. 11, 2001, the nation’s top intelligence officials said Tuesday” (Dilanian, 2013). This juxtaposition with al-Qaeda only served to heighten the military valence of China’s cyber activities, and a push to prepare for such a threat. Indeed, in the words of Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL): “The threat, to be sure, is real—and, we cannot allow ourselves to grow complacent …” (Nelson 2008). Snowden’s revelations of US spying on China in June of 2013 drastically changed the shape of the discussion however. Snowden demonstrated that the NSA (1) had two data centers in China from which it had been inserting spy software into vulnerable computers; (2) targeted the Chinese University of Hong Kong, public officials, businesses, and students; (3) hacked mobile phones; and (4) in 2009, hacked the Pacnet headquarters in Hong Kong, which runs one of the biggest regional fibre-optic networks. In response to Snowden’s revelations, a spate of articles compared the United States’ and China’s hacking, displaying a range of attitudes from journalists—some espoused that both countries demonstrate equivalent transgressive behavior, while others argued that China has crossed the line into more aggressive hacking that goes beyond the United States’ more benign “preemptive” hacking. The latter attitude indicates the resilience of tropes of the Yellow and Red Perils, a China whose inherent ideological and cultural differences with the West makes it a threat. The different lenses through which journalists and pundits viewed China’s spying in comparison with that of the United States further invoke this Orientalist demarcation. An article in The Washington Post thus contrasts China’s behavior against that of the United States, which merely seeks “to examine huge amounts of communication metadata around the world to look for trends” and “to preempt some threat against the U.S.” China’s spying is described, however, as “infiltrating almost every powerful institution in Washington, D.C.,” “breaking into major news organizations,” “stealing sensitive military technology,” and “stealing so much intellectual property that China’s hacking has been called the ‘greatest transfer of wealth in history’” (Fisher, 2013). Drawing in particular on incendiary words like “stealing” and “infiltrating,” this article distinguishes China as a sneaky thief. US journalists and pundits, in charging China with stealing economic resources, have further solidified the demarcation of China as an inferior and dangerous Other. A well-circulated quote by national security pundit Adam Segal stated, “The problem is we’re not talking about the same things … We’re trying to make a distinction between cyber economic espionage and normal political- military espionage. The Chinese don’t make that same distinction” (Bengali & Dilanian, 2015). By portraying China as unable to grasp the fundamental distinction between economics and national security, Segal suggests China’s thievery is connected to a more fundamental character flaw—China is unable to grasp proper civilized norms. Similarly, US official response has been that China’s view of data collection as a sovereign right has rendered them essentially different from the United States and by implication, the civilized world. That Chinese governmental espionage involves the collection of economic intelligence that is shared with Chinese companies further departs from civilized norms. Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency thus explained that “they clearly don’t have the same lines in the sand, if you will, with that regard” (Bennett, 2015). Historically, US depictions of China as uncivilized have occurred whenever China has gained power or threatened US interests. The narrative of China as a sort of child following in the United States’ footsteps on the path to modernity has proven exceedingly popular since World War II and frames the US approach to China as a potential ally and resource who at the same time may never be civilizable (Kim, 2010; Vukovich, 2012). In this Orientalist narrative, China’s journey to modernity is always understood as precarious and, moreover, subject to US vigilance as to whether it meets the appropriate benchmarks. The title of an editorial in The Washington Post epitomizes current iterations of this sentiment and the ease with which Orientalist imagery can be invoked to portray China’s path to modernity as needing US guidance when China falls out of line: “The US Needs to Tame the Cyber-Dragon: Stronger Measures are Need[ed] to Block China’s Economic Espionage [emphasis mine]” (“The U.S. Needs to Tame,” 2013). In reality, US vigilance can be attributed to the concern since the end of the Cold War, that a “sleeping giant” able to challenge US global hegemony is awakening (Kim, 2010). Thus, the cultural work done by portrayals of China as unable to adhere to civilized norms serve to bolster the image of China as perpetually unprepared to be a responsible member of the international community. In fact, this narrative of China’s thievery serves to persuade the American public that China is a threat to the international community. One Wall Street Journal journalist perfectly echoes this sentiment: A China that leads the world in the theft of intellectual property, computer hacking and resource nationalism will prove extremely destabilizing. If it continues on this course, Beijing should not be surprised if other countries begin to band together to collectively counter some of the more harmful implications of China’s rise. A better outcome for all will be for China to embrace its responsibilities to help lead the world … (Metzl, 2011) This article, although hopeful that China may at some future point become a responsible global actor, even leader, ultimately reifies the notion that an increase in China’s global power is always suspect.

### Link—SCS & ECS Scenarios

#### ECS and SCS scenario construction relies on tropes of a lawless China – justifies US aggression and manifest destiny

Ooi and D’Arcangelis 2017 [Su-Mei, associate Professor of Political Science at Butler University, and Gwen, associate professor of Gender Studies at Skidmore College, “Framing China: Discourses of Othering in US News and Political Rhetoric,” *Global Media and China*, 2.3-4, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2059436418756096>, accessed 07/11/22, GDI-ATN]

China as lawless bully: maritime disputes To cheat and thief, we can layer the trope of lawlessness, readily employed in media representations and political rhetoric over maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China and its neighbors in the Western Pacific. China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are largely historical in nature and do encroach on the 200 nautical miles EEZ of neighboring countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not expressly prohibit land reclamation in the sea as long as due notice is given to other concerned states and due regard to the rights of other states (Art. 60.3, 56.2, and 56.3) is taken into account, while the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment is observed (Art. 192). Parties to a dispute are also obligated to refrain from acting in a manner that would jeopardize or hamper a final agreement resolving the dispute (Art. 74.3 and 83.3). The frantic building of artificial islands to enhance the legality of China’s claims, unilateral installations, and skirmishes in the disputed areas are thus amenable to interpretation as lawless bullying. An editorial in the Wall Street Journal titled “Calling Out China’s Lawlessness; The US Points Out that Beijing’s Claims to the South China Sea Don’t Stand Up,” describes the “sketchy legality of its [Beijing’s] actions” and claims that “China is changing the status quo in the South China Sea with force and the threat of force” (“Calling Out,” 2014). This characterization in the media is consistent with political rhetoric. US Secretary of State John Kerry was reported to have said in May 2014 that China’s “introduction of an oil rig and numerous government vessels in waters disputed with Vietnam was provocative” (Ives & Fuller, 2014). Eliot Engel of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee framed China’s actions in skirmishes with Vietnam as “needless provocations” (Engel, 2014). At the same time, media representations and political rhetoric have tended to obscure the fact that China’s regional neighbors all built airstrips and outposts on the claimed islands long before China ever did. China also displays inconsistent behavior in that it has reached agreements with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin and South Korea in the Yellow Sea to divide fisheries equally and carry out joint enforcement patrols in keeping with international law.3 Indeed, China has in land disputes signed “fair and balanced” treaties with 13 out of 14 neighbors in keeping with international legal principles (Kraska, 2015). These instances have not, however, drawn any significant media attention. Instead, the emphasis on China’s non-compliance with international law in the South China Sea disputes has served to recapitulate China in Orientalist terms as uncivilized and, moreover, as a fully awakened “sleeping giant” that bullies its neighbors and is unsuited to replace the US as regional leader. US political rhetoric and media representation has also obscured the vagueness of international law when applied to the East China Sea dispute as it would be inconsistent with the image of China as a lawless bully in the South China Sea. The UNCLOS appears to have a straightforward framework that gives states maritime jurisdiction over resources 200 nautical miles from their coastal baseline, but it says nothing about how overlapping maritime jurisdictions are to be resolved. In the case of the East China Sea, the area of dispute is only 360 miles across at its widest point. At the heart of the territorial dispute between China and Japan is the “territorial acquisition” of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, but there is no convention on how states acquire sovereignty over disputed territories.4 The flexibility of applicable principles in international customary law have instead allowed both China and Japan to invoke the law to justify their claims to sovereignty (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008). China’s refusal to have the dispute adjudicated by an international body reflects the unpredictability of outcomes and not necessarily China’s lawlessness, especially when viewed, in light of a similar disinterest on the part of the Japanese. The essentialization of China as lawless, despite the malleability of international law and dissimilar behavior in other disputes, has the potential to drive a wedge between China and her neighbors, thus “containing” China’s growing influence in the region. Indeed, the depiction of China as a lawless bully plays up the insecurities of its immediate—and in many cases, much weaker— neighbors, whose heavy reliance on international law to constrain hegemonic behavior is palpable. The breaking of norms has been identified as a crucial signal that heightens threat perception (Farnham, 2003). In the context of long-standing maritime territorial disputes, playing up an image of China as a lawless bully also suggests that the United States continues to be a necessary power broker in the region. The notion that there is an overbearing bully in the neighborhood that could care less about the rules of the game returns the United States to the role of protector in the post– Cold War period—its ostensible “manifest destiny.” Since the late 1990s, titles such as “Spratly Spat Heats up over Chinese ‘Bullying’” (Lamb, 1998) or “Asian Nations Support US Silently” (Wiseman, 2001) demonstrate how constructing China as a lawless bully serves to reinforce this purpose. Indeed, a recent editorial in The Wall Street Journal makes this link explicit in the text: Washington’s hesitant response has allowed controversy to build around freedom-of-navigation missions that should be routine. Beijing’s strategy in the South China Sea is to bully its neighbors and achieve regional hegemony through coercive means short of war. Turning peaceful naval patrols into diplomatic hot potatoes is exactly the sort of change Beijing seeks. (“A 12-Mile,” 2015) Here, China’s behavior is portrayed as incorrigibly belligerent, in distinct contrast to genteel US diplomacy. One Wall Street Journal article makes this point clear in its title alone: “Chinese Diplomacy Off Course; By Overreaching in the South China Sea, Beijing has Drawn the US Irrevocably into the Debate” (Wain, 2000). This article embodies the dominant narrative that assumes implicitly the rightful role of the United States to dole out proper diplomacy and take on any transgressors to maintain world peace. A Wall Street Journal article describing China’s “increasingly powerful—but highly opaque—military and its more assertive stance [towards the South China Sea]” emphasize China’s military as an inherent threat to world order but construct the US military according to a different standard, again assuming the righteousness of US military intervention (Page, 2011). In this regard, it is important to note that US grand strategy consists of preventing the development of any regional power capable of obstructing US access to Eurasia—where most of the world’s resources and economic activity are located. This long-term security goal has informed the Obama administration’s much-touted Pacific Pivot policy, which many have viewed as a “China containment policy.” A Congressional Report notes that although U.S. policymakers have not often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military (and diplomatic) operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal. (O’Rourke, 2014) China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea cover about 90% of the area that could potentially allow China to deny the United States such access. As China continues with the modernization of its naval and air capabilities, US apprehension has increased that the disputed land features in the South China Sea are being used to bolster military and coast guard forces that can monitor and respond to the activities of US allies, deny the US navy access to these waters, and ultimately check US naval dominance in the region. It is for this reason that the United States has insisted on freedom of navigation and innocent passage—protected by UNCLOS—through these contested waters, although tensions with China have ratcheted up considerably as a result. As direct conflict between the United States and China has become a real possibility, and as the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS, the United States has attempted to base its actions on firm legal principles, and in turn, to frame China’s behavior in the region as lawlessness. Through US portrayals of China as a lawless bully, China incurs reputational costs in the global and regional community that have the potential to exert pressure on China to stand down. The guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen was thus sent in October 2015 on a “freedom of navigation” patrol within 12 nautical miles of islands artificially built by China in the Spratly chain, which the United States insists is in compliance with international law.5 The United States revealed this aim in another dispute on whether China has an international legal right to regulate foreign military actors operating within China’s 200-nautical-mile EEZ. The United States’ view, which China disagrees with, is that China has a right to restrict military and surveillance activities only within 12 nautical miles of its territorial waters. Tensions reached new heights when China announced in November 2013 an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that not only covered her territorial waters but extended into its EEZ and thus, the contested areas in the East China Sea. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel responded in a press statement that “We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations,” yet the United States followed shortly by flying two B-52 bombers through the zone (Harlan, 2013).

## Russia

### Link—Ukraine Reps—1NC

#### The Aff’s moralizing over Ukraine does nothing and costs them nothing –their moral blackmail to take sides for NATO is depoliticizing and eliminates space for critical interrogation.

Chandler 22 [David, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Opinion – Political Positionality and the War in the Ukraine,” *E-International Relations*, 03/25/22, <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/03/25/opinion-political-positionality-and-the-war-in-the-ukraine/>, accessed 07/22/22, GDI-JCR]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to have caught the political zeitgeist as a moral cause capable of reinvigorating failing political leaders, parties, and ideologies whether radical or conservative. Demonstrating support for the Ukraine appears to be practically mandatory in workplaces and public spaces the same way as wearing masks and socially distancing was during the earlier days of the pandemic. In the face of the moralising, widespread across the political spectrum, possibilities arise for critical approaches which start from a different political positionality. Support for Ukraine appears to have helped political actors, international institutions and civil society groupings in their search for legitimacy and moral purpose. However, there is a certain hollowness to this ‘support’ which is more a matter of declaration than any willingness to go to war for the sake of the Ukraine let alone ease the path of EU accession. Supporting Ukraine involves little personal cost or commitment. People feel morally good about supporting Ukraine in a way that they would not about declaring any support for political parties or individuals. In a world where people appear to be alienated from political parties and formal political projects, politics can easily become a matter of moral or ethical declaration rather than political engagement in building constituencies and relations. For this reason, political issues can easily become moralised; taken out of strategic relations and presented as existential questions. Carl Schmitt makes this point in Theory of the Partisan, in distinguishing telluric and non-telluric struggles. Non-telluric struggles, no longer grounded in a specific context, tend towards existentialist extremes, lacking a concrete audience and goals. Western responses to the war highlight how moralisation has displaced practices of politicisation. The goal of politicisation is to clarify political stakes in the process of building a social and political movement of transformation. Moralisation is a poor substitute for this approach to community building as it abstracts individual political questions and issues from the contexts from which they derive. More importantly, moralisation leads to solipsism where what were previously political questions become statements of personal or group identity. In the absence of political and organisational alternatives, reducing politics to demonstrating moral virtue leaves only limited room for political manoeuvre. The fact that doing ‘politics’ means expressing a ‘position’ has meant that those on the left have been forced into choosing between the rearmament of NATO powers and defending Putin’s regime, choosing between bad imperialists and even worse imperialists. For some this limit has been spun into a positive, for example with Spiked magazine giving full backing to NATO, bemoaning the ‘moral defeatism of the West’ and wondering ‘Is nothing worth a war?’ Our current context challenges the traditional understanding of political positionality. In the past a critical political response to international conflict may well have been oriented to the ‘enemy at home’, flagging up the double standards of Western moral and militarist claims (the ‘whataboutism’ discussed by Lorenzo Kamel). The political positionality of being a Western observer rather than a participant would have potentially restrained militarist demands to intervene because these calls for war could only empower ruling elites and institutions with extensive problematic records of their own. Today, the framework which enabled this form of political positionality appears to have dissipated. This change is reflected in the fact that the moral consensus over the Ukraine is very different to the moralised political discourse of previous international conflict situations, where there was also the mobilisation of moral outrage, for example, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. The level of consensus is particularly striking considering that Western powers are (as yet) not directly involved. In fact, it is not so much even a political question of taking sides, more one of whether and how to demonstrate support. Today, in the face of the moral displacement of politics it seems that a new understanding of political positionality may be necessary. One that recognises that traditional political frameworks no longer shape responses to events in the international sphere. From an anti- or ante- political positionality it seems clear that we should refuse the moral blackmail of taking sides and choosing a political position. It would be nice to pretend that we still lived in a modernist world of meaningful political choices, where ‘taking sides’ was part of a broader grand narrative of struggle and progress. However, we do not live in a world of left and right but in its moralised afterlife. From a political positionality that recognises this shift, we should refuse the lure of the political and the moral pressure to declare our support for Ukraine. We should refuse the demand to moralise war and conflict. We should de-moralise the afterlife of politics and the world that enables it. Rather than exaggerating and bemoaning the ‘moral defeatism’ of the West we should rather be pushing it further. Is nothing worth a war? Perhaps as Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon recognised, the only war worth starting is one to end the world (and its political afterlife) rather than to salvage it.

#### The moralizing frame around support for Ukraine is rooted in racialized and militaristic constructions of international civil society. These moral binaries prompt further violence and crush critical dissent.

Chandler 22 [David, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Opinion – War in Ukraine: Why We Should Say No to International Civil Society,” *E-International Relations*, 03/16/22, <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/03/16/opinion-war-in-ukraine-why-we-should-say-no-to-international-civil-society/>, accessed 07/22/22, GDI-JCR]

With the ongoing war in the Ukraine, international politicians and campaign organisations are continually inviting us to express support for the solidarity actions of international civil society. International civil society is increasingly seen to be key in pressurising the Russian regime and mobilizing public opinion behind the defence of the Ukraine. Who wouldn’t want to be part of international civil society? Who wouldn’t want to take the opportunity to show that they belong to international civil society, even to show that they take their membership responsibilities seriously? Against this growing moral consensus, it is important to flag up the unpleasant paradox at the heart of international civil society. The paradox is that international civil society is in essence neither particularly international nor inclusive, nor particularly civil and peace-loving, but rather works upon divisive moral binaries which can easily become highly racializing and dangerously militaristic. Firstly, ‘international civil society’ is not very international. Whilst the rhetoric of solidarity with the Ukraine is couched in universalizing terms of ‘global’, ‘world-wide’ or ‘international’ moral outrage, the states of the Global South have been notably absent from moral grandstanding. This has led some commentators to suggest the possibility of a new non-aligned movement, which rejects the Western demands of war and rearmament for ‘peace’. However, the problem of ‘international civil society’ rhetoric is not merely that it is exclusive and selective on a factual level. It is deeply divisive because ‘international civil society’ can only come into existence on the basis of a moral binary which provides its ethical identity. If there is no construction of an existential threat there is no international civil society. Thus, the demand for solidarity with ‘international civil society’ is necessarily morally divisive. It is necessarily against someone or something morally to be excluded, as not just ‘uncivil’ but an entity that in its ‘uncivility’ is a threat or an offense to ‘international civil society’. The performance or construction of ‘international civil society’ thereby is indistinguishable from demands for denouncing/ sanctioning/ cancelling/ withdrawing from/ banning/ whoever is constructed as a threat to or ‘outside’ international civil society. Because ‘international civil society’ is constructed as a moral or ethical identity, the binary division easily becomes a totalizing one. There can be no grey areas, no room for ambiguity. Paradoxically this not only makes ‘international civil society’ lacking in its very internationalism, in terms of its need for division and exclusion, it is also not very civil. There is very little protection afforded those on the wrong side of the moral divide, while those with the moral high ground have little to constrain them. To illustrate the second paradox, the lack of civility, a good example of what happens when you end up on the wrong side of ‘international civil society’ has been the media and institutional treatment of the Russian gymnast Ivan Kuliak who attached a ‘Z’ symbol to his leotard, at a recent World Cup event, showing support for the Russian forces. He is alleged to have ‘provoked global anger’; the International Gymnastics Federation immediately condemned his “shocking behaviour” and he now faces the prospect of losing his medal and a lengthy ban from the sport. Of course, international civil society is not all about bans and restrictions on free speech. Hate speech restrictions are being lifted to allow Facebook and Instagram users in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus to call for the deaths of Russians and Russian soldiers. The parent company of Facebook and Instagram, Meta, is also to allow praise of the Ukrainian far-right Azov battalion, which is normally prohibited. A spokesperson stating the company was “for the time being, making a narrow exception for praise of the Azov regiment strictly in the context of defending Ukraine, or in their role as part of the Ukraine National Guard”. Of course, we have been here before, when ‘international civil society’ was regularly relied upon to legitimise taking sides in another conflict on Europe’s margins, during the late 90’s and the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Here, too, there was international moral outrage, embedded media reporting bringing the horrors of war into every living room and the illegal bombing of European capital cities. Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that US and European-led ‘international civil society’ easily went from moral outrage calling for humanitarian aid for besieged European capital Sarajevo to support for the ‘illegal but legitimate’ bombing of European capital Belgrade. We should say no to international civil society because totalizing moral binaries are particularly dangerous in the sphere of international relations, where international law lacks universal mechanisms of enforcement. Readers might think it’s unproblematic to implement selective rules for political symbolism in sports or for hate speech on social media depending on what side of the moral divide of ‘international civil society’ individuals are on. However, it is clear that moralizing the international order, in the ‘paradigm shift’ called for by UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, can only further cohere existing international inequalities and postcolonial hierarchies.

# Alternative

## Historical Method

### 2NC AT “Act Now” / “Case is a DA”

#### Only a critical historical methodology can liberate knowledge from the epistemological hegemony underlying NATO conceptions of security. The Aff’s call to action is a totalitarian orientation toward time that masks unconscious Eurocentric interests and assumptions.

**da Mota**, PhD in IR at University of Coimbra, **2016** (Sarah Carreira, "NATO: upholding Civilisation, protecting Individuals. The unconscious dimension of international security," University of Coimbra, September 2016, google scholar, accessed 7/6/2022, gdi-tmur)

The suggestion of embracing time more critically has to do with adopting a view that is no longer focused on the immediacy of change, on recent institutional developments, but that rather espouses longer processes of change more focused on meaning and perception formation and their diffusion in time. This is a way of accompanying the evolution of ideas, and understanding how the temporal distance of original contexts may be eroded and dispersed through hegemonic knowledge, thus turning into an unconscious, accepted and naturalised knowledge. In order to justify such an approach, this dissertation will proceed by exposing the intellectual zeitgeist and the core theoretical corpus that support my view. After that, it will be possible to elaborate on the key argument of this research, that is, NATO’s particular endorsement of the Individualisation of Security has acted as a transformative process of post-Cold War international security, through which Western civilisation is actually upheld and continued in the field of international security. In accordance with the epistemological concerns and challenges exposed so far, and drawing on the suggestion of embracing time more critically in order to uncover the processes of knowledge establishment, this study is largely set within Critical Theory and other “alternative approaches”, to quote Richard Wyn Jones (2001: 3), like poststructuralism and postmodernism. Questioning the prevailing forms we have of perceiving and knowing both the concept of civilisation and the emergence of certain normative patterns such as the Individualisation of Security in international security, remits to one fundamental concern of Critical Theory, that is, the relationship between knowledge and values and, more broadly, between knowledge and society (Devetak, 1995). Put as such, this dissertation embraces Critical Theory as more than a conceptual toolkit; not only is it a philosophical and methodological positioning, as an essential social commitment towards the liberation of knowledge as well. Originally, Critical Theory is derived from various strands of Western social, political and philosophical thought. The reference to the “Frankfurt School” is used interchangeably with “Critical theory” usually to refer to a group of thinkers from the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research) first established in Frankfurt in 1923, including Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and others more “loosely affiliated thinkers” like Walter Benjamin and Eric Fromm (Peoples, 2009: 8). The Frankfurt School is inspired by the thinking of Immanuel Kant, Georg Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud, in a synthesis of various traditions of modern theory, including German Idealism, Historical Materialism, Modernism and Psychoanalysis (Roach, 2008). Given the diversity of the intellectual background of those thinkers – philosophy, sociology, musicology, and psychoanalysis – this school has a “self-consciously inter-disciplinary nature” that provides its analysis of social change with a deeper understanding of society (Peoples, 2009: 8-9). Yet, it can be said that the common thread unifying them is basically a Marxian tradition of producing “an analysis of society that aims […] to support a process of emancipatory social transformation” (Wyn Jones, 2001: 6). In very significant ways, the emergence of Critical Theory actually challenges the dominating social model in the West in the aftermath of WWI, which is quite revealing of an overall Western crisis at the time – social, ideological, intellectual, political. The first enunciation of “Critical Theory” as such appeared in 1937 in an essay of Max Horkheimer, to describe his own research programme under the auspices of the Frankfurt School. In his critique of what he termed “Traditional Theory”, Horkheimer denounced scientific positivism and those forms of social science that tried to imitate the objectivity of the natural sciences. Thinking the theorist could somehow be detached from the social world was an illusion, so he deemed. In opposition to that, Horkheimer defined his theory as self-critical, in that it acknowledged its own function within society (Horkheimer, 2002; Müller-Doohm, 2006: 171). This is clearly inspired by Georg Friedrich Hegel’s (1977), who was the first concerned with bringing into visibility the internal contradictions, tensions, distortions – in Hegel’s term the “negative” – of the categories of mind constitutive of knowledge. Also, according to Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), scientific rationality evolves according to a latently totalitarian logic of domination, so it is bound up with ideological systems, which ultimately is an attempt at domesticating nature and enslaving humanity. This is central to conceive the potential for contribution of Critical Theory in this dissertation regarding the problems raised since the beginning of this introduction. In particular, it highlights how hegemonic knowledge shapes the perceptions and representations of the world in a way that makes certain ideas persist in detriment of others, which makes human mind to stagnate, and prevents it from progressing towards new meanings, and from achieving genuine social change. Indeed, critical thinkers are particularly aware of the non-exempt relationship existing between knowledge and society, and invariably probed forms of hegemonic knowledge. That is why Critical Theory generally stands for the non-acceptance of the prevailing order, on the basis that the order we know is “[b]y no means natural, necessary or historically invariable” (Devetak, 2005a: 143). This awareness further implies that critical thinking also “[r]eflects the process of learning to do theory in the sense of becoming aware of one’s changing ties to (identity with) society” (Roach, 2008: xvi). The complex relationship between knowledge claims, politics and power is specifically approached by postmodernism, whose definition is fairly disputed. Many authors considered as such do not even use the term – like Michel Foucault, for example – and sometimes prefer “post-structuralism” or “deconstruction” (Devetak, 2005b: 161). In the field of social philosophy, postmodernism expresses an “ex-Leftist exhaustion and disillusion”, having as a key figure the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, a disillusioned former militant of the far-left grouplet Socialisme ou Barbarie (Therborn, 2006: 186). It is interesting to note that both this reference to the opposition between socialism and barbarism, and Horkheimer’s concern with the abandonment of all culture and barbarism (Müller-Doohm, 2006: 172) basically posit the idea of civilisation as the value centrally at stake within Critical Theory, for they enounce barbarism as the negative side of Traditional Theory. In The Postmodern condition: a report on knowledge (1984), Lyotard focused on the status of science and technology, technocracy and the control of knowledge and information. In it, he highlighted the ethical dimension underlying the legitimation of knowledge, which should not be about denotative utterances, but rather about normative prescriptions: [t]he only role positive knowledge can play is to inform the practical subject about the reality within which the execution of the prescription is to be inscribed. […] It is one thing for an undertaking to be possible and another for it to be just. Knowledge is no longer the subject, but in the service of the subject: its only legitimacy (though it is formidable) is the fact that it allows morality to become reality (Lyotard, 1984: 36). Postmodernism has strived to denaturalise the epistemological dispositions inherent to the Modern paradigms of political, economic and social organisation, including the prevailing identity formations that appear as normal, as social conventions or dogmas (Devetak, 2005b: 166). Indeed, as its name indicates, the postmodern school of thought essentially confronts the grand narratives of Modernity. The “project” of Modernity, as Jürgen Habermas (1983) calls it, emerged during the eighteenth century. It was an intellectual and secular effort undertaken by Enlightenment thinkers to develop human rationality, through objective science, universal morality and law, with the ultimate goal of liberating individuals from the irrationalities of religion, myths, superstition, and from the arbitrary use of power (Harvey, 1996: 12-13). As a concept, Modernity was first developed by Hegel, who used it in historical contexts to describe a precise epoch. Around 1800, the reference to the “modern times” – in English, and temps modernes in French – depicted the three centuries just preceding (Habermas, 1998: 5). Postmodernism was never intended to be a social theory as such; it began as a movement within architecture and the arts, primarily literature, expressing a revolt against the rigid formalism of modernism, without being a rejection of, or a movement against, Modernity per se (Delanty, 2006b: 270-271). The postmodern critique towards Modernity often discloses its problematic relationship with time. Modernity essentially embraced the idea of progress in a way that obliterates the past, the old, the traditional, only to look into a reachable future where modern man, society, civilisation have only one direction, that is, forward (Therborn, 2006: 187). In the artistic field, for instance, a modern artist was considered to be someone with the capacity to extract the fleeting qualities of society and individuals, and freeze them in time to make them universal and eternal (Harvey, 1996: 20- 21). Postmodernists perceive far more nuance and shadow, and see history as “[a] series of dominations replacing other dominations, and the knowledgeable subject as the site for the interplay between these dominations rather than the vehicle for their transcendence” (Smith, 1997: 334). Postmodernism enhances the influence of temporality upon the fixation of meanings within society, because Modernity as a socio-historical construct erects seemingly timeless meanings, thus creating illusions of knowledge. This is precisely related to the epistemological illusions Hobson (2002) identifies in IR, as exposed above. Modernity thereby implies a form of exclusionary knowledge that leaves many social meanings and alternatives aside. In fact, at the time of Enlightenment, history was viewed as a uniform process that generates problems. Time became experienced as a pressure over the need to master the problems that arose, and the new modern world would be privileged over the old by the fact that “[i]t opens itself to the future, the epochal new beginning is rendered constant with each moment that gives birth to the new” (Habermas, 1998: 6). Therefore, Modernity narrates the past as a time reigned by ignorance, superstition, oppression, poverty, disease, stagnation, imitation, and depicts the project of an emancipating future, one that liberates from the misery of the past towards a rational, individualised, ever-growing, developed, creative and progressive society (Therborn, 2006: 187). In such a context, where the past is constantly revised, and the present redeemed by the potentialities of the future, time becomes naturalised in a predictable order of events and expectations, and the new problems arising are silenced by this pressure of time. The meaning of time is rarely debated, as we tend to take it for granted in our common-sense attributions, around which we organise our daily routines (Harvey, 1996: 201). The critique of the treatment of time is a topic that Walter Benjamin persistently engaged with, namely through his critique of historicism, which he considered a way to tell history as a “sequence of events like the beads of a rosary” (Benjamin, 1973: 263). Benjamin rejected this Modern conception of time as linear progress, and urged for rethinking the idea that the future is the natural continuation of present and past. The past, according to Benjamin, can only be seized in an image occurring at a specific moment that is not to be repeatable. As a consequence, the present is only a transition, an interruptive force that seizes an image of the past. The past, which Benjamin calls “tradition”, is always in danger of being appropriated for political purposes. That is why Benjamin saw documents of culture as documents of barbarism, in that the victors endowed with the legitimacy to write history determine what the past means (Benjamin, 1973: 257; Ferris, 2008: 132-133). In turn, the future was seen to offer something other than the extension of the same forms of social and political life (Stephens, 2009: 79). Benjamin thus rejoined Critical Theory by providing the future with a transformative potential, that is, with emancipation from temporality. Benjamin allows transitioning to post-structuralism’s contribution. Like postmodernism, post-structuralism is not anti-modern, nor against the project of Modernity or Enlightenment. Rather, it refuses to accept it as a pre-packaged set of ideas that can be applied linearly like a tradition, and does not take it as “temporal or spatial field of uniform content” with definite boundaries (Ashley, 1989: 260). Accordingly, the project of Modernity must develop a critical historical account of how we came to be what we are, a reflection of the self-formative processes (Devetak, 1995). Post-structuralism offers a more specific contribution in its formulation against the totalisation of knowledge and in the search for its deconstruction, by proposing methodological tools that address the epistemological challenges identified so far. Richard Ashley’s piece “Living on border lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and war” (1989) is central in conceiving the epistemological challenges inherent to Western culture. Ashley (1989: 261) exposes the influence of Logocentrism as the hegemonic system of expressions of duality, such as core/periphery, continuity/change, literal/figural, nature/culture, individual/collective, domestic/international, etc. He further explains that this logocentric tradition under Modernity tends to impose hierarchy, whereby one side of interpretation becomes sovereign for the participant, while the other is defined solely in relation to the former. Logocentric discourse thereby privileges one term only of the opposition (ibid.). While the privileged term is held as the source of truth and as a priority, the second is conceived as a deviation, complication, deterioration, accident (Ashley, 1989: 262). Ashley resorts to literary theory to claim that a “narrative structure is imposed upon history” (Ashley, 1989: 282), implying that [a] narrative reasserts closure by imposing a central ordering principle whose categories and standards of interpretation are taken to express the essential and timeless truth integrating all of the historical times and places among which it discriminates. It constructs a story in which all time, all space, all difference, and all discontinuity are cast as part of a universal project in which the ordering principle is itself redeemed as necessarily, timelessly, and universally true (Ashley, 1989: 264). This seemingly goes in Lyotard’s sense (1984), who deemed there is a resurgence of narrative knowledge in the West as a way of solving the problem of legitimating the new authorities. From this, one may assume that the conceptual and theoretical limitations of IR in dealing with the West, which were identified above, are clearly the focus of many strands of Critical Theory. The exclusionary essence of Western mental structures and sense of time appears to have impacted upon the very creation of scientific knowledge itself. In this sense, IR would be the victim of Modernity too, hence the challenge of scientific emancipation. That is why Michel Foucault (1995: 31) attempted to “write the history of the present”. His intent was to ask how we have made the present seem like a normal or natural condition, and what has been forgotten or remembered in order to legitimise the present and its courses of action. Put in other terms, he focuses on how societies arrive at particular practices of inclusion and exclusion that not only allow forgetting or remembering, as they also differentiate the Self from Otherness. Hence the importance of a deeper reflection on the underlying spatial and temporal context of actors, ideas and concepts that might allow understanding how they have become an unconscious issue. Throughout his work, Michel Foucault’s philosophical approach sought to deconstruct and denaturalise central concepts and visions of history that shape our knowledge of the world. In order to do that, Foucault questioned how a certain issue becomes a problem historically, i.e., how it was problematised in history (Neal, 2009: 167). One central method he advocates is the archaeological analysis, which insists on the historicisation of discourses, techniques, and practices in respect of their specific spatial and temporal circumstances (ibid.). To Foucault (2003: 269), the predominant historicalpolitical discourse that Modernity deals with is a discourse that inverts the traditional values of intelligibility, and explains things in confuse, obscure, and disorganised ways. The interpretive tools used within this tradition have to do with the confusion and physical force of violence, passion, hate, revenge, and a series of circumstances that are articulated in terms of defeats and victories, confrontations among alliances, and rebellions (ibid.). On the contrary, Foucault views history as a set of declarations, documents, institutions, and notions that cumulate and interact. Therefore, he rejects that all might be reduced to one grand narrative supporting the states’ and the West’s sovereign presence as being at the centre of world history (Neal, 2009: 165). As such, the archaeological method privileges decentralisation, and the historicisation of institutions together with their respective power relations: Basically, I had been doing nothing except trying to retrace how a certain number of institutions, beginning to function on behalf of reason and normality, had brought their power to bear on groups of individuals, in terms of behaviors, ways of being, acting, or speaking that were constituted as abnormality, madness, illness, and so on. I had done nothing else, really, but a history of power (Foucault, 2000: 283). Power relations are essential, for they surface around a given problem to include the web of individuals that constituted it as a problem, acted to solve it, used particular forms of language, and made concepts to emerge, as well as techniques, methods, and knowledge in order to answer that problem (Neal, 2009: 167). This is in part a “genealogical” exercise, in the sense that we need to focus on “a form of history that can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects” (Foucault, 2000: 118). Genealogies are therefore not positivistic returns to a form of science that is more attentive or more accurate. Genealogies are, quite specifically, antisciences. […] They are about the insurrection of knowledges. Not so much against the contents, methods, or concepts of a science; this is above all, primarily, an insurrection against the centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse organized in a society such as ours (Foucault, 2003: 9). As this theoretical section has insisted so far, Critical Theory provides different perspectives that all concur to give visibility and deconstruct the enslaving domino effect of interrelated aspects of Western Modernity, namely, a rigid conception of temporality that encloses meanings within a stagnated knowledge, and ultimately naturalises unquestioned behaviour and identity, thereby excluding a whole world of epistemological and social possibilities. In this context, Foucault provides very pertinent tools to inquire on NATO’s civilisational identity and post-Cold War normative evolution around the Individualisation of Security and simultaneously rejoin the aforementioned precepts of Critical Theory. First, one may conceive the possibility that a modern narrative on Western civilisation, confined within a static linearity of time and progress, has influenced the conscious knowledge we have of NATO as the product of a normal evolution of a pre-existing civilisational identity. In the sense of what Foucault advises, the spatial and temporal context of NATO’s emergence should be questioned in relation to how the past was appropriated, and through what kind of practices of domination and relations of power. Moreover, one may also assess to what extent NATO may benefit from the West’s cumulated capital of domination in order to influence and control the field of international security. Therefore, NATO may draw on the West as a civilisational entity to adopt new norms without jeopardizing the representations we have of NATO, that is, questioning what it essentially does, how and why. However, by uncovering what those practices of domination and power relations consist of, and how they have produced hegemonic knowledge, an essential unconscious dimension remains in the realm of what has been subjugated, i.e., of what has been dominated in order to naturalise the hegemonic content of knowledge. This phenomenon is in part illustrated by André Barrinha and Marcos Rosa (2013: 110), who show that security meanings in the context of NATO or the EU are appropriated by their members in such a way that they end up “translating a particular liberal understanding of security that is in many cases completely foreign” to their own security context. Put in other words, the naturalisation of knowledge implies that unconscious meanings have to be conveyed and seized through the narratives on Western civilisation.

#### A genealogy capable of challenging contemporary security structures must refuse the pull of easy “alternatives” – this is key to new understandings and possibilities

Der Derian 1998 [James, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, *On Security*, GDI-JCR]

We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified."1 From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability."2 One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite. There are also prodromal efforts to shore up the center of the International Relations discipline. In a newly instituted series in the International Studies Quarterly , the state of security studies is surveyed so as to refortify its borders.3 After acknowledging that "the boundaries of intellectual disciplines are permeable," the author proceeds not only to raise the drawbridge but also to caulk every chink in the moat.4 Recent attempts to broaden the concept of "security" to include such issues as global environmental dangers, disease, and economic and natural disasters endanger the field by threatening "to destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems."5 The field is surveyed in the most narrow and parochial way: out of 200-plus works cited, esteemed Third World scholars of strategic studies receive no mention, British and French scholars receive short shrift, and Soviet writers do not make it into the Pantheon at all. The author of the essay, Stephen Walt, has written one of the better books on alliance systems;6 here he seems intent on constructing a new alliance within the discipline against "foreign" others, with the "postmodernist" as arch-alien. The tactic is familiar: like many of the neoconservatives who have launched the recent attacks on "political correctness," the "liberals" of international relations make it a habit to base their criticisms on secondary accounts of a category of thinking rather than on a primary engagement with the specific (and often differing) views of the thinkers themselves.7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' "8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought."9 Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.10 The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. In traditional realist representations of world politics as the struggle for power among states, the will to security is born out of a primal fear, a natural estrangement and a condition of anarchy which diplomacy, international law and the balance of power seek, yet ultimately fail, to mediate.11 By considering some historical meanings of security that exceed this prevailing view, I wish to suggest "new" possibilities and intelligibilities for security. Admittedly, this brief genealogy is thin on analysis and thick on description. But my intention is to provoke discussion, and to suggest that there is more than a speculative basis for the acceptance of a concept of security that is less coherent and dogmatic, and more open to the historical complexity and contingent nature of international relations.

### 2NC Alt—Discourse Key

#### Securitization is enacted through the everyday practices and speech acts of regular people, making discourse a key site of resistance

Wibben 16 [Annick, Anna Lindh Professor for Gender, Peace & Security @ Swedish Defence University, “Opening Security: recovering critical scholarship as political,” *Critical Studies on Security*, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21624887.2016.1146528>, accessed 07/11/22]

Opening security, as noted, is necessary because the politics of security are found in contestations over meanings of security in particular enactments. Huysmans ’take on the Copenhagen School’s speech act approach is helpful here. As he points out, ‘the notion of “act” is central for understanding the political investment made in moving towards studying security as a speech act’(Huysmans2011, 372). Rather than focusing on the conditions of possibility for speaking security, Huysmans proposes that it is the act that ‘conditions the political critique of security practice that is possible within this approach’(2011). He goes on to note that to act ‘is neither arriving at a scene nor fleeing from it, but actually engaging in its creation’(Huysmans2011, 373, quoting Isin 2008). What is more, ‘an act actualized in a decision introduces responsibility towards others. One cannot hide behind necessity, routine, habits, in the act of security creation. Speaking security is a decision to rupture a situation with certain calculable consequences for others’ (2011). Conceptualized in this way, security practices enacted in a particular moment are deeply political. Studying the politics of security consequently requires attention to these acts and their conditions of possibility.10 Huysmans pushes this idea further, suggesting that the creative speech act which produces political consequences for which those involved in the decision are accountable, also requires ‘the affirmation of undecidability, the radical openness and the creativity of being, the possibility of the unexpected; actions that cannot be fully folded back into calculability and instituted normativity’ (Huysmans2011, 374). This move, which chal-lenges epistemological conventions of IR, is key to an opening of Security Studies. Husymans recognizes this when he proposes that in a focus on the speechact, we canretain‘a radical distance from normative and causal orders: its politicality resides in its rupturing quality’(2011). This is most obvious when we are talking about the spectacular decisions that, as Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) maintain, move security from the broader political realm to the exception realm of national security as ‘high politics’–but this is also exactly what Huysmans criticizes: Speech acts of security enact a sharp distinction between the exceptional and the banal, the political and the everyday, the routine and creative. This implies an elitist vision of politics. Securitizing analysis mostly focuses on leaders or politicians–‘statesmen’–who speak security with sufficient clout while ordinary people continue their everyday lives (2011,375).11What about all those everyday ‘security nothings’ where there is ‘less an actualization of a critical decision and more a continuous process of assembling objects, subjects and practices,’ asks Huysmans (2011, 377)? As he outlines, drawing on the work of Luise Amoore and Marieke deGoede (2008), the everyday practices of the gathering of data through bureaucratic management practices, surveillance, and more needs to be rendered political because it is used to profile, to distinguish, to mark boundaries–essentially to securitize ever larger areas of life. What is more, the decisions involved as well as those involved in making them are not spectacular, and the ruptures they represent are dispersed and thus garner much less attention. However, they are no less (and maybe more) consequential for those on the receiving end of official security politics/policy–Booth’s‘voiceless’. The many bureaucrats and security agents that decide on and imple-ment these endless security acts ‘are the “petty sovereigns” who enact the sovereign power to decide arbitrarily’ even while they would likely maintain that they are ‘only following the rules’(Huysmans2011, 380, quoting Butler 2004).12Indeed, part of the technocratic approach to the management of populations involves leading so-called ordinary people to believe that real political decisions are made only at the level of elite politics instead of in the realm of everyday decision-making. I would argue that not only is attention to the everyday necessary because it is the site where security practices are being dispersed and produce effects, but also because the everyday is, for many, a more realistic site of resistance. An opening of security, which focuses on the everyday enactments of security, makes this possible.13 Recognizing that ‘security nothings’ are indeed deeply political recalls the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’: it is only in attention to the particular of the everyday that we can fully grasp the impact of security. Cynthia Enloe’s work has long exhibited this insight. Over 25 years ago, in her widely acclaimed Bananas, Beaches & Bases, Enloe proposed that ‘one of the simplest and most disturbing feminist insights is that“ the personal is political”’(1990, 195). In the revised edition of this classic, she clarifies:‘ Asserting that “the personal is political” is disturbing, intentionally disturbing, because it means that relationships we once imagined were (and many of our friends and colleagues still prefer to think are) private or merely social are in fact infused with power’(2014, 348). What is more, she urges us to consider that the political is personal also, and that ‘men who dominate public life in so many countries [...] have used their myriad forms of public power to construct private relationships in ways that have bolstered their own masculinized political control’(2014). Enloe’s work, like much feminist work in IR, points out that security politics are to be found in the everyday–and that paying attention to particular‘ security nothings’–hearing and amplifying rather than becoming the voice of the voiceless–profoundly challenges the stories we tell.

### 2NC Alt—Genealogy Key

#### Genealogical critique that attends to the knowledge production undergirding contemporary security practices is key to challenging global systems of oppression and structural violence

Wibben 16 [Annick, Anna Lindh Professor for Gender, Peace & Security @ Swedish Defence University, “Opening Security: recovering critical scholarship as political,” *Critical Studies on Security*, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21624887.2016.1146528>, accessed 07/11/22]

Since contexts and our location within them shape, limit, and enable our research, critical scholarship further necessitates tracing the history of a genre (Gattungsgeschichte) through a genealogy of a concept, idea, or issue area. Such a genealogical trace, Vivienne Jabri asserts, must be performed in relation to the current context because ‘the lived experiences of past generations come to form the memory traces of the present, [they are] constitutive of life in the present’(2004, 266). For example, in their discussion of sexual violence as a weapon of war, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern (2013) start byq uerying the not just ‘the dominant story of sexual and gender-based violence (the “Gendered” Story, as we call it)’(14) asking questions about its plot, character construc-tion, and more (see also Wibben2011), but also by digging into its genealogy ‘by first exploring the main account that precedes and haunts it (the “Sexed” Story)’ (Eriksson Baaz and Stern2013, 14). The current social and political context is ‘a reflection of a distinct and particular articulation of the present, emergent from a particular and distinct reading of history, a particular subjectivity’(Jabri2004, 266). Security Studies is not a neutral field of study but an articulation of a particular configuration of events–which can and must be challenged as critical feminists, postcolonial scholars and poststructur-alists all point out, albeit from different starting points. Excavating these genealogies makes past transformations visible and reveals potential points for further opening security. While a deepening and broadening allows for some transformation as well, an opening directly addresses the politics of Security Studies notj ust in the abstract, but also in specific enactments. To open security we need to ask: ‘How in the present does power operate?’ and pay attention ‘to structures of domination that permeate these transformations’(Jabri2004, 267). Jabri suggests that ‘it is relations of power that ultimately reveal the congealment of hegemonic, institutionalized practices that determine the legitimate, the acceptable, and the remits of politics’(2004). Critical approaches challenge us to trace the genealogies of what security has come to mean in particular spatio-temporal locations (see also Ciutǎ2009), while engaging in a social analysis of those locations to articulate an embedded critique. Security Studies is deeply implicated in justifying and upholding the current interna-tional system; a system shaped, in large part, by European imperialism and colonialism. Its knowledge practices are part and parcel of the (epistemic) violence embedded in IR–they are implicated in creating and maintaining the insecurities and injustices that critical scholarship should aim to transform. Opening security lays bare how IR’s limits on what constitutes an acceptable research agenda, with attendant notions of objectivity and scientism, negates politics and thus denies the political nature of all knowledge claims. It is imperative, therefore, to carefully scrutinize the politics of thinking about security indifferent ways and, conversely, their enactment. Insisting on the politics of Security Studies requires greater focus on the axis of opening, in addition to a broadening and deepening. This opening, a strand of critical research that has been present all along but has not been explicitly named, is necessary to generate new security imaginaries. Opening security necessarily calls the frame into question and reveals how ‘the frame never quite contained the scene it was meant to limit [...] something was already outside which made the very sense of the inside possible, recognizable’(Butler2009, 9). Security Studies has been too narrowly focused on particular forms of (state) violence directed mostly at other states. Opening security with a critical (feminist) approach implies challenging epistemic, direct, and structural violence, as manifested in varied sites of study.16It also entails revealing how Security Studies frameworks contribute to these violences by limiting what can be seen and heard, an endeavor which feminist scholarship has successfully taken on. A more rigorous use of curiosity and imagination would also allow non-feminist scholars in IR to see that, despite claims to the contrary, ‘the frame never quite determined what it is we see, think, recognize, apprehend’ (Butler2009, 9) and that Security Studies, to remain relevant, must be disrupted by attention to particular enactments of security that have always exceeded these frames. All the while critical scholars need to remain reflexive and explore the limits of their own horizons: What is it that we do not yet know? How can we write and produce knowledges in such a way that allow for the next person to question and displace them, if necessary? How might we incorporate ambiguity and uncertainty for a more accurate account of security that can be un-made and re-made, again and again? Only by recogniz-ing security as made, examining how it is enacted in multiple locations, can we challenge the politics of security along with its (oft violent) ties to the capitalist state. If we are serious about emancipatory knowledges, we must challenge the ways Security Studies supports intersecting systems of oppression, from racism and sexism to imperialism.

## AT Permutation

### 2NC AT Perm

#### The perm fails – the call to “do both” only makes critical opposition subservient to the larger operation of the North Atlantic war machine. Appropriation of bits of critical rhetoric is precisely the mechanism by which discourses of war and racialization gain legitimacy.

Chandler 22 [David, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Opinion – The Myth of Being Anti-Racist and Anti-War in the Ukraine Conflict,” *E-International Relations*, 03/02/22, https://www.e-ir.info/2022/03/02/opinion-the-myth-of-being-anti-racist-and-anti-war-in-the-ukraine-conflict/, accessed 07/22/22, GDI-JCR]

It would be nice if the choices we are confronted with by the Russian invasion of Ukraine were pure ones. However, much of the anti-war coverage of the conflict has been overladen with racial and colonial stereotypes. This has been picked up on in a fair amount of media coverage, with articles such as: ‘Please, Stop Using Racist Language To Talk About The Ukraine And Russia Conflict: If you find yourself connecting more with this European war, ask yourself why’; ‘Arabs decry ‘racist’ double standard in Ukraine media commentary’, ‘Trevor Noah slams media for racist remarks on Ukraine: War ‘was Europe’s entire thing’, ‘Coverage of Ukraine has exposed long-standing racist biases in Western media’. What has been particularly picked up on has been the media tropes of shock that war could take place in ‘the heart of Europe’ with the bombing of major European cities and the outrage that ‘civilization’ should be so rudely upset by Putin’s ‘medieval’ thuggery. The Washington Post, provides a disturbing snapshot: A commentator on a French news program said, “We’re not talking about Syrians fleeing bombs of the Syrian regime backed by Putin; we’re talking about Europeans leaving in cars that look like ours to save their lives.” On the BBC, a former deputy prosecutor general of Ukraine declared, “It’s very emotional for me because I see European people with blue eyes and blond hair … being killed every day.” Even an Al Jazeera anchor said, “These are not obviously refugees trying to get away from areas in the Middle East,” while an ITV News reporter said, “Now the unthinkable has happened to them, and this is not a developing, Third World nation; this is Europe.” The political or ethical purity of calling out the war and supporting the fight for Ukrainian independence would seem potentially threatened or undermined by the media double-standards of care and concern for white or European victims of conflict. Many people have been sensitised to the double standards of Western care and concern with the high profile of Black Lives Matter and Rhodes Must Fall campaigns. As students of International Relations, we are no doubt aware of Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon’s powerful indictments of these double standards in concern over slaughter in Europe when the violence of colonialism was ignored.[1] This is where the calls for, what can be called ‘both/and’, can seem compelling. I have noticed on the social media feeds of some friends and colleagues that there is a concern to legitimate the position that one can be both for the Ukraine and also make a stand against the racializing terms of the anti-war discussion. The implication is that we can have a pure anti-war discussion without a racializing element. It is this assumption that I’d like to bring into question in this short piece. It seems clear that the relation between being anti-war and pro-war is one of mutuality rather than opposition. Other friends of mine who have been busy on social media with anti-war work seem to have no hesitation in demonizing countries and populations already at the sharp end of US and EU sanctions and intimidation. A good example is the popular tweet ‘Ukraine vs Russia: Who Does Europe Support’ where the whole of Europe is united with the exceptions of the isolated and pro-Russian, Serbia and Belarus. The moral opprobrium of being pro-Russian of course is co-constitutive of the moral superiority of being pro-European and pro-Ukrainian. When even the contrarian commentator Brendan O’Neil is posting demands on social media, like ‘Fuck off, Belarus’, the sense of manipulation and desperation in the anti-war posturing seems too powerful to ignore. This anti-war posturing seems to be indistinguishable from pro-war posturing. In this feverish climate it is little surprise that the anti-warmongers are rewriting international political relations. Typical is the pro-war/anti-war European Union which, on the back of the conflict, has declared a “watershed moment” in its history. The EU’s treaties bar it from funding operations with military or defence implications so €5 million is being found ‘off-budget’ in the EU’s first ever interference in a conflict to finance the purchase and delivery of weapons and other equipment to a country that is under attack. Similarly Germany is making its own historic shift to return to military intervention in Europe, sending 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stinger anti-aircraft defence systems to the Ukraine. It would be nice if it was possible to make neat demarcations. It would be nice if it was possible to distinguish an individual’s personal ideals and desires from the political and ideological context in which they are expressed. Yet, what seems inescapable is the fact that anti-war political interventions in our contemporary times are necessarily indistinguishable from pro-war ones. The ‘anti-war’ movement that has politically mobilized nearly the entirety of international society, from the UN, NATO and the EU down to UEFA and International Olympic Committee, not only is waging its own war ‘against war’ but is also retrospectively legitimating the Western-led military interventions of the recent past. In staging this ethical unity against Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, the lack of legitimacy of any comparison to US-led and NATO bombing campaigns against Belgrade, Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya is chilling. The possibility of a non-racializing or non-colonial anti-war discussion is premised upon the promise of another type of war, one that is even more morally pure. To refuse the discourses of war and racialization it is necessary to do more than place them in critical relation to those of anti-war and anti-racialization. Instead, we should refuse to distinguish the two. It is only in the relation, in the contra-positioning, that war gains its moral grounding.[2] War needs the legitimacy of anti-war campaigning, racializing needs the legitimacy of anti-racialization, all this can be seen, if we wish to see it, in discussions of the war in the Ukraine. The outcome of this war is that the international order is secured rather than destabilized as pariah states are demoralized or demonized further and leading international institutions are militarized and relegitimized. This is a war that threatens us all.